Data/hora: 01/06/2024 17:40:02

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL:  HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?	
Autores: 	Baerenklau,   Kenneth A.	
Data: 	2004-01-06	
Ano: 	2002	
Palavras-chave: 	Environmental Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution.  A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium.  Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator.  But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.	
Tipo: 	Journal Article	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	12210

http://purl.umn.edu/31117	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002	
Formato: 	14

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