Data/hora: 03/06/2024 10:04:12

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT	
Autores: 	Bystrom,   Olof; Bromley,   Daniel W.	
Data: 	1997-05-14	
Ano: 	1996	
Palavras-chave: 	Environmental Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	33

http://purl.umn.edu/12620	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of Wisconsin-Madison&gt;Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics&gt;Staff Papers

Staff Paper 392	
Formato: 	31

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