Data/hora: 11/06/2024 13:23:27

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter
Autores: | Revilla,   Pablo.
Data: | 2008-01-14
Ano: | 2007
Palavras-chave: | Many-to-one matching; Hedonic; Coalitions; Stability; Colleagues; Marketing; C78; D71.
Resumo: | This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched  to the same institution. With an unrestricted  domain of preferences  the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents’ preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers’ ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

28407

http://purl.umn.edu/7443

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Coalition Theory Network Working Papers

CTN Nota di Lavoro 87.2007

Formato:

34

application/pdf