Data/hora: 06/06/2024 01:14:53

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND EXCESSIVE NITROGEN USE IN AGRICULTURE	
Autores: 	Preckel,   Paul V.; Shively,   Gerald E.; Baker,   Timothy G.; Chu,   Mei-Chin; Burrell,   Jessica Eide.	
Data: 	2004-01-05	
Ano: 	2000	
Palavras-chave: 	Crop Production/Industries.	
Resumo: 	This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.	
Tipo: 	Journal Article	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	12093

http://purl.umn.edu/30902	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;Volume 25, Number 02, December 2000	
Formato: 	17

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