Data/hora: 06/06/2024 15:33:49

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?	
Autores: 	Bond,   Philip; Pande,   Rohini.	
Data: 	2006-01-26	
Ano: 	2005	
Palavras-chave: 	Coordination; Public policy; Income taxation; Implementation; International Development; O21; H23.	
Resumo: 	Individuals’ inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual’s incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government’s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government’s ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	19595

http://purl.umn.edu/28436	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Yale University&gt;Economic Growth Center&gt;Center Discussion Papers

Center Discussion Paper No. 924	
Formato: 	38

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