Data/hora: 13/06/2024 03:48:22

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs	
Autores: 	Endoh,   Masahiro.	
Data: 	2006-01-27	
Ano: 	2005	
Palavras-chave: 	Cross-border donations; Truthful equilibrium; Pareto-efficient tariffs; Public Economics; D72; F13; H21; P48.	
Resumo: 	This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each country’s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes efficiency of policy formation. Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them more sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. When ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national special interest groups and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained at which world welfare is maximized.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	19651

http://purl.umn.edu/28397	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Yale University&gt;Economic Growth Center&gt;Center Discussion Papers

Center Discussion Paper No. 915	
Formato: 	33

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