Data/hora: 07/06/2024 01:29:15

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network
Autores: | Richefort,   Lionel; Point,   Patrick.
Data: | 2011-01-05
Ano: | 2010
Palavras-chave: | Common-pool Resource; Digraph; Cycle; Independent Set; Empirical Example; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D85; H41.
Resumo: | A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by one-way flows of hydrological influence between cities of a river basin that may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal effort and the others free ride. It is also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/98470

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

147.2010

Formato: | 43