Data/hora: 11/06/2024 09:02:03

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Cooperation and Cheating
Autores: | Cross,   Robin M.; Buccola,   Steven T.; Thomann,   Enrique A.
Data: | 2006-07-21
Ano: | 2006
Palavras-chave: | Marketing.
Resumo: | In this article, we extend the variable delivery claim framework (Cross, Buccola, and Thomann, 2006) to examine the option-to-cheat, that is, the option to shift production between contracts ex post.  We use this framework to provide a solution to the age-old conflict between enforcement and the cooperative tradition of providing a “"home"” for member produce.  We show that, in contrast to Nourse’'s competitive yardstick hypothesis, the value of the cooperative-provided option increases as market competition intensifies.  When the option-to-cheat is fairly-priced, it is Pareto improving, increasing grower returns, lowering cooperative per-unit costs and reducing contract shortfalls for investor-owned rivals at no additional per-unit cost.  Our valuation framework is consistent with replication-based equilibria and is free from parametric specification of individual preference or firm cost structure.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

23100

http://purl.umn.edu/21158

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA

Organized Symposium Paper

Formato:

30

application/pdf