Data/hora: 01/06/2024 10:19:00

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Renegotiation Without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions
Autores: | Engel,   Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer,   Ronald; Galetovic,   Alexander.
Data: | 2006-06-28
Ano: | 2006
Palavras-chave: | Public Economics.
Resumo: | Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition's review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most countries. Hence, renegotiations allow incumbents to spend more without being subject to Congressional oversight.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

22761

http://purl.umn.edu/28382

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Yale University&gt;Economic Growth Center&gt;Center Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 937

Formato:

15

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