Data/hora: 15/06/2024 03:01:44

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds
Autores: | Jackson,   Matthew O.; Golub,   Benjamin; Jackson,   Matthew O.
Data: | 2007-07-27
Ano: | 2007
Palavras-chave: | Social Networks; Learning; Diffusion; Bounded Rationality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D85; D83; A14; L14; Z13.
Resumo: | We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naively update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors' opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies converge to the truth, despite their naive updating. We show that this happens if and only if the influence of the most influential agent in the society is vanishing as the society grows. Using simple examples, we identify two main obstructions which can prevent this. By ruling out these obstructions, we provide general structural conditions on the social network that are sufficient for convergence to truth. In addition, we show how social influence changes when some agents redistribute their trust, and we provide a complete characterization of the social networks for which there is a convergence of beliefs. Finally, we survey some recent structural results on the speed of convergence and relate these to issues of segregation, polarization and propaganda.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

26873

http://purl.umn.edu/9101

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Coalition Theory Network Working Papers

CTN Nota di Lavoro 64.2007

Formato:

46

application/pdf