Data/hora: 06/06/2024 11:02:59

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core	
Autores: 	Koczy,   Laszlo A.	
Data: 	2009-10-26	
Ano: 	2009	
Palavras-chave: 	Partition Function; Externalities; Implementation; Recursive Core; Stationary Perfect Equilibrium; Time Consistent Equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72.	
Resumo: 	We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/54365	
Relação: 	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Sustainable Development Papers

SD

83.2009	
Formato: 	28