Data/hora: 05/06/2024 11:41:25

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	GAME MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY	
Autores: 	Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.	
Data: 	1998-04-29	
Ano: 	1995	
Palavras-chave: 	Environmental; Policy; Open; Economy; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; F13; Q28.	
Resumo: 	In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game where there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer distortions but are less costly to implement. In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone.  Published in Annals of Regional Science 30 (2, 1996): 185-200.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	622

http://purl.umn.edu/28364	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Utah State University&gt;Economics Department&gt;Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers

ERI Study Paper 95-11	
Formato: 	28

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