Data/hora: 01/06/2024 10:28:06

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Creating Incentives for Micro-Credit Agents to Lend to the Poor
Autores: | Aubert,   Cecile; de Janvry,   Alain; Sadoulet,   Elisabeth.
Data: | 2006-02-06
Ano: | 2004
Palavras-chave: | Micro-credit; Pro-poor; Objectives; Incentives; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; O16; D82; L31.
Resumo: | Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have introduced incentive pay schemes for their credit agents to induce information acquisition on borrowers. Bonuses linked to repayment are efficient for profit-oriented MFIs but insufficient for nonprofit MFIs trying to reach very poor borrowers, when repayment and wealth are positively correlated. We show that no incentive scheme is consistent with this (non-verifiable) objective: Random audits on the share of very poor borrowers selected by the agent become necessary. Under the optimal contract, non-profit MFIs generally maximize the number of poor borrowers it services by crosssubsidization between very poor and less poor borrowers.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

19771

http://purl.umn.edu/25024

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 988

Formato:

36

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