Data/hora: 12/06/2024 03:07:45

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Article 82 EC – The Problems and The Solution
Autores: | Lang,   John T.
Data: | 2009-10-23
Ano: | 2009
Palavras-chave: | Article 82EC; Competition; Abuse; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; K21.
Resumo: | The Commission's Guidance paper on exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC is open to three fundamental criticisms.  First, it leads to less legal certainty, because the rules suggested are vague and imprecise, because dominant companies will not have the information needed to apply them, and because the Commission is trying to change the law, which it has no power to do. Second, it would lead to some anticompetitive effects, because in practice it discourages price competition, by discouraging individualised price negotiations and retroactive rebates, and by suggesting that the Commission will protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors from price competition. Third, it leads to too many "false positives", i.e., findings of exclusionary abuse that are not justified in economics or law. The solution is to return to the test in the Treaty as interpreted by the Court of Justice:  an exclusionary abuse must involve limiting the production, marketing or technical development of competitors of the dominant company, if harm is caused to consumers.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/54282

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Institutions and Markets Papers

IM

65.2009

Formato: | 37