Data/hora: 11/06/2024 05:43:24

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard, and Structural Change in Agricultural Cooperatives
Autores: | Zeuli,   Kimberly A.; Foltz,   Jeremy D.
Data: | 2005-05-17
Ano: | 2005
Palavras-chave: | Agribusiness.
Resumo: | The federated business structure exists in many sectors of the economy, but we know little about its comparative advantage. This paper explores theoretically and empirically the current dynamics of the federated cooperative system. Two hypotheses are tested: growth at the local co-op level has made the structure redundant and managerial incentives create disloyalty. We use a unique data set from a survey of local farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives in the Midwest.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

16455

http://purl.umn.edu/19226

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI

Selected Paper 136746

Formato:

26

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