Data/hora: 11/06/2024 11:56:35

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements
Autores: | Gonzalez,   Patrick.
Data: | 2011-11-15
Ano: | 2011
Palavras-chave: | Certification; Voluntary agreements; Pigovian taxes; Pollution; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q53; Q58.
Resumo: | I model the participation of firms in a voluntary agreement as a costly certification process whereby a firm informs the Regulator of its pollution intensity. Without this knowledge, the Regulator imposes the same tax on all firms in a heterogeneous industry, unduly hurting the clean ones with the lowest intensity. Certification allows clean firms to get a tax rebate. It also entails an informational externality as the dispersion of types decreases within the pool of non-participating firms, following an unraveling process. Because participation is a firm’s private decision, there is such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

ISSN 1927-5544

http://purl.umn.edu/117827

Relação:

University of Laval&gt;Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE)&gt;Working Papers

CREATE Working Paper

2011-2

Formato: | 35