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Provedor de dados:  AgEcon
País:  United States
Título:  Contracting with Smallholders under Joint Liability
Autores:  Kaminski, Jonathan
Data:  2010-08-12
Ano:  2009
Palavras-chave:  Contract farming
Moral hazard
Joint liability
Peer monitoring
Agricultural Finance
Consumer/Household Economics
Farm Management
Financial Economics
Public Economics
Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
Resumo:  Replaced with revised version of paper Jan. 11, 2012

This paper examines the performance of contract farming when agents are groups of jointly-liable farmers who receive input credit from a monopsonistic agribusiness. Accounting for group mechanisms in credit repayment through joint liability and peer monitoring, we derive the optimal monopsonistic contract under moral hazard on production effort. The principal takes into account price incentives not only on farmers’ effort but also on peer monitoring. Then, we show that the optimal pricing rule is not monotonic with respect to the group’s characteristics. Imperfect information implies a distortion on pricing for low-efficient groups, which is Pareto-improving from a social point. Groups of intermediary size and heterogeneity provide the best effort and peer-monitoring incentives.
Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma:  Inglês
Relação:  Hebrew University of Jerusalem>Department of Agricultural Economics and Management>Discussion Papers
Discussion Papers
Formato:  39

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