Consulta: creatorFacets:"Kwasnica,   Anthony M."
Registros recuperados: 3
Data/hora: 10/06/2024 18:25:15

Allocating Pollution Load Reductions between States Fairly, Efficiently and Successfully
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Kwasnica,   Anthony M.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Pollution; Politics; Chesapeake Bay; Transboundary Agreements; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q58.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117407

An Iterative Auction for Spatially Contiguous Land Management: An Experimental Analysis
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Banerjee,   Simanti; Shortle,   James S.; Kwasnica,   Anthony M.
Tackling the problem of ecosystem services degradation is an important policy challenge.  Different types of economic instruments have been employed by conservation agencies to meet this challenge. Notable among them are Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes that pay private landowners to change land uses to pro-environmental ones on their properties. This paper focuses on a PES scheme – an auction for the cost-efficient disbursal of government funds for selection of spatially contiguous land management projects. The auction is structured as an iterative descending price auction where every bid is evaluated on the basis of a scoring metric – a benefit cost ratio. The ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency of the auction is tested with data...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Ecosystem Services; Economic experiments; Auctions; Spatial contiguity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103220

The Agglomeration Vickrey Auction for the promotion of spatially contiguous habitat management: Theoretical foundations and numerical illustrations
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Banerjee,   Simanti; Shortle,   James S.; Kwasnica,   Anthony M.
There is much interest among economists and policy makers in the use of reverse auctions to purchase habitat conservation on private lands as a mechanism for minimizing public expenditures to achieve desired conservation outcomes. Examples are the Conservation Reserve Program (US) and Environmental Stewardship Scheme (UK). An important limitation of these auctions as implemented to date is that there is no explicit consideration of the spatial pattern of participation in the evaluation of bids. In this study we present the structure of a simple auction – the Agglomeration Vickrey Auction that implements a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The auction is designed to attain conservation goals through specific spatial patterns of land management while...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Environmental conservation; Spatial; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49337