Consulta: subjectFacets:"Enforcement"
Registros recuperados: 22
Data/hora: 07/06/2024 09:39:32

Incentive effect of joint and several liability in fishery cooperatives on regulatory compliance
Provedor de dados: 5
Autores: Bellanger, Manuel; Holland, Daniel S.; Anderson, Christopher M.; Guyader, Olivier.
Cooperative‐based catch share systems can be implemented such that the members of the same fishery cooperative are jointly and severally liable for not exceeding collectively assigned fishing rights. In practice, this means that a regulator can take away catch privileges from an entire cooperative that overruns its collective quota, effectively creating a penalty much larger than what could be recovered with an individual fine. Fishery cooperatives then typically implement their own internal compliance regime that includes monitoring and penalties. This article first reviews compliance practice in cooperative‐based catch share systems by examining the commonalities and differences in the way compliance regimes are structured (observation and reporting...
Tipo: Text
Palavras-chave: Co-management; Compliance regime; Enforcement; Harvester cooperatives; Monitoring; Nested institutions.
Ano: 2019
URL: https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00495/60667/64202.pdf

The Normative Efficiency Ranking of Output and Export Subsidies under Costly and Imperfect Enforcement
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Giannakas,   Konstantinos.
This paper builds on the literature on agricultural policy analysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by analyzing the effect of enforcement costs and noncompliance on the relative transfer efficiency of output and export subsidies. Analytical results show that, in addition to changing the incidence of output and export subsidies, relaxing the assumption of perfect and costless enforcement found in the traditional analysis of these policy instruments can affect their relative efficiency in transferring income to producers. The effect of enforcement issues is shown to depend on the way export subsidies are being administered and the size of the exporting country.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Agricultural policy; Export subsidies; Output subsidies; Enforcement; Noncompliance; Transfer efficiency; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58277

Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission Trading System
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: D'Amato,   Alessio; Valentini,   Edilio.
This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not sufficient...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Emissions Trading; Environmental Federalism; Enforcement; Monitoring Cost; Environmental Economics and Policy; F18; K42; Q53.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46654

Agri-Environmental Program Compliance in a Heterogeneous Landscape
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lankoski,   Jussi E.; Lichtenberg,   Erik; Ollikainen,   Markku.
Heterogeneity of agricultural landscapes may necessitate the use of spatially targeted instrument combinations to implement the social optimum.  But compliance with these policies may require costly enforcement.  This paper examines the design of agri-environmental policies featuring two of the most commonly used instruments, reductions in fertilizer application rates and installation of riparian buffers.  While compliance with buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost, fertilizer application is only verifiable through costly monitoring.  We derive optimal subsidies for fertilizer reduction and buffer strip set-asides and enforcement strategies for the cases of low and excessive monitoring costs.  An empirical simulation model suggests...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Nutrient runoff; Monitoring; Enforcement; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q18; H23.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37797

The Efficacy of TRIPS: Incentives, Capacity and Threats
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Kerr,   William A.
There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Incentives; Intellectual property; Knowledge economy; Threats; TRIPS; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23815

Should we impose emissions taxes that firms evade?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.
Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply.  In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967

DETECTING EVIDENCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE IN SELF-REPORTED POLLUTION EMISSIONS DATA: AN APPLICATION OF BENFORD'S LAW
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Dumas,   Christopher F.; Devine,   John H.
The paper introduces Digital Frequency Analysis (DFA) based on Benford's Law as a new technique for detecting non-compliance in self-reported pollution emissions data. Public accounting firms are currently adopting DFA to detect fraud in financial data. We argue that DFA can be employed by environmental regulators to detect fraud in self-reported pollution emissions data. The theory of Benford's Law is reviewed, and statistical justifications for its potentially widespread applicability are presented. Several common DFA tests are described and applied to North Carolina air pollution emissions data in an empirical example.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Benford; Digital frequency analysis; Pollution monitoring; Pollution regulation; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2000
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21740

Cross Compliance: what about compliance?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stefani,   Gianluca; Giudicissi,   Eufrasia.
We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Moral Hazard; Enforcement; Agri-environmental schemes; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q15; Q58; D82.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99597

IDENTITY PRESERVATION AND LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED PRODUCTS: SYSTEM DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Moschini,   GianCarlo; Lapan,   Harvey E.
This paper analyzes economic issues that arise in devising a credible and enforceable system of identity preservation and labeling for genetically modified (GM) and non-GM products. The model represents three stages in the supply chain: farm production, marketing handlers, and final users. The possibility of accidental co-mingling of non-GM products is modeled at the marketing stage. Regulation takes the form of a threshold level of purity for non-GM products, a probability of government testing to verify compliance with the threshold level, and a fine for violators. Uncertainty is modeled explicitly, such that would-be suppliers of non-GM products always face some risk of failing the test and incurring a fine. The paper also presents a novel demand...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Biotechnology; Enforcement; Food labeling; Identity preservation; Regulation; Uncertainty; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18355

Agri-environmental program compliance under heterogeneous conditions
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lankoski,   Jussi E.; Lichtenberg,   Erik; Ollikainen,   Markku.
Heterogeneity of agricultural landscapes may necessitate the use of spatially targeted instrument combinations to implement the social optimum. But compliance with these policies may require costly enforcement. This paper examines the design of agri-environmental policies featuring two of the most commonly used instruments, reductions in fertilizer application rates and installation of riparian buffers. While compliance with buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost, fertilizer application is only verifiable through costly monitoring. We derive optimal subsidies for fertilizer reduction and buffer strip set-asides and enforcement strategies for the cases of low and excessive monitoring costs. An empirical simulation model suggests that...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Nutrient runoff; Monitoring; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44381

Impact of Government-Sponsored Pollution Prevention Practices on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: Evidence from a Sample of US Manufacturing Facilities
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Sam,   Abdoul G.
A two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored pollution prevention (P2) practices on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental violations in three industries while increasing violations in two others. P2 adoption also spurs fewer enforcement actions in three industries. I further partition the P2 practices into three categories based on their approach to improve environmental performance. In doing so, I find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures--about a third of adopted P2 practices--such as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Pollution Prevention Act; P2 practices; Compliance; Enforcement; Poisson models; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q53; L51; C23.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49306

The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Chavez,   Carlos A.; Villena,   Mauricio G.
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Stranlund,   John K.
Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382

An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.
Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking.  Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions trading; Laboratory experiments; Permit markets; Permit banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93966

Monitoring of compliance in Australian conservation contracts
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Crowe,   Bronwyn; White,   Benedict; Pannell,   David J.; Lindner,   Robert K.
Government and non-government conservation agencies have long-term goals and objectives to provide environmental services, such as conserving the biodiversity of Australian native vegetation. In addition to national parks and reserves, private lands are often included in conservation programs to achieve these objectives. Formal contracts are entered into between the private landholder and the conservation agency to provide environmental services, or more commonly to provide inputs that are likely to lead to environmental services. The paper examines the costs and benefits of monitoring these conservation contracts when biodiversity change is stochastic.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Conservation; Compliance; Monitoring; Enforcement; Environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/5990

When No Law is Better than a Good Law
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Bhattacharya,   Utpal; Daouk,   Hazem.
This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Insider trading; Cost of capital; Emerging markets; Securities law; Enforcement; International Development; G15; G18; K22; K42.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51184

THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Giannakas,   Konstantinos.
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous producers to examine the economic causes of IPR infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the interest groups and the pricing and adoption of a new technology (i.e., a genetically modified seed) in the context of a small open developing economy. Enforcement of IPRs, and pricing and adoption of the new technology are modeled as a sequential game between the government that enforces the IPRs, a foreign innovating firm that prices the new technology, and the developing country’s producers who make the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that complete deterrence of IPR infringement is not always economically optimal. IPR infringement affects the welfare of the interest groups and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Biotechnology; Enforcement; Infringement; Intellectual property rights; TRIPs agreement; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies.
Ano: 2001
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/16063

Is the Facilitation of Sustainable Market Access Achievable?   Design and Implementation Lessons from Armenia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Gow,   Hamish R.; Shanoyan,   Aleksan.
Over the past three decades the globalization in agri-food sector has been accompanied by a dramatic restructuring, liberalization and privatization of markets often with serious adverse consequences for small farmers in developing and transition countries. Consequently, governments and the international donor community have markedly shifted their development policies from traditional technology transfer approaches towards more market-driven approaches of linking farmers to markets. The international agricultural development literature has begun exploring the appropriate structure of third-party facilitated institutions and enforcement mechanisms to support linking small farmers to markets. Based upon a series of long-term qualitative and quantitative...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Market Linkages; Small Farmers; Institutions; Governance; Enforcement; Armenia; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90818

Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Stranlund,   John K.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low.  Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Compliance; Emissions trading; Permit markets; Pollution; Laboratory experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42124

Market Competition, Institutions, and Contracting Outcomes: Preliminary Model and Experimental Results
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: MacDonald,   James M.; Wu,   Steven Y.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Competition; Market Power; Enforcement; Institutions; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Production Economics; C91; D02; D43; D86.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50625

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: McEvoy,   David M.; Murphy,   James J.; Spraggon,   John M.; Stranlund,   John K.
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126

Monitoring of Compliance in Western Australian Conservation Contracts
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Crowe,   Bronwyn; White,   Benedict; Pannell,   David J.
Contracting with private landholders for labor towards production of environmental services (payment for actions) or the environmental services themselves (payment for outcomes) is reliant on the environmental organization’s ability to monitor and assess the environmental outcomes provided. Inaccurate and costly assessment reduces the cost effectiveness of the contract. Different assessment technologies will have different impacts on the cost effectiveness and optimal contracting choice of the environmental organization. The paper compares the influence of field assessment by a local expert, and remote assessment via satellite imagery, on the optimal contracting decision for the Western Australian wheat belt.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Conservation; Environmental; Compliance; Monitoring; Enforcement; Environmental regulation; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91155