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Registros recuperados: 12
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A Pro-Market Agenda for El Salvador AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A..
This paper argues that, despite important productivity gains, reforms have benefited consumers much less than expected in El Salvador. Antitrust legislation, consumer protection and an adequate regulation of privatized utilities are central ingredients of a successful market economy. Major reforms that are needed in each one of these areas in El Salvador are described.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market reform; Antitrust legislation; Consumer protection; Privatization; Regulation of utilities; Political Economy; D18; L40; L51; L94; L96; O12.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28438
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Adjustment is Much Slower than You Think AgEcon
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A..
In most instances, the dynamic response of monetary and other policies to shocks is infrequent and lumpy. The same holds for the microeconomic response of some of the most important economic variables, such as investment, labor demand, and prices. We show that the standard practice of estimating the speed of adjustment of such variables with partial-adjustment ARMA procedures substantially overestimates this speed. For example, for the target federal funds rate, we find that the actual response to shocks is less than half as fast as the estimated response. For investment, labor demand and prices, the speed of adjustment inferred from aggregates of a small number of agents is likely to be close to instantaneous. While aggregating across microeconomic units...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Speed of adjustment; Discrete adjustment; Lumpy adjustment; Aggregation; Calvo model; ARMA process; Partial adjustment; Expected response time; Monetary policy; Investment; Labor demand; Sticky prices; Idiosyncratic shocks; Impulse response function; Wold representation; Time-to-build; Financial Economics; C22; C43; D2; E2; E5.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28419
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Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better? AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples-procurement, royalty contracts and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demsetz auction; Double marginalization; Franchising; Joint vs. separate auctions; Monopoly; Procurement; Dealerships; Royalty contracts; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D44; L12; L92.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28406
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Effective Labor Regulation and Microeconomic Flexibility AgEcon
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Cowan, Devin N.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Micco, Alejandro.
Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the process of creative-destruction, is at the core of economic growth in modern market economies. The main reason for why this process is not infinitely fast is the presence of adjustment costs, some of them technological, others institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation. While few economists would object to such a view, its empirical support is rather weak. In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find strong evidence for it. We use a new sectoral panel for 60 countries and a methodology suitable for such a panel. We find that job security regulation clearly hampers the creative-destruction process, especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced. Moving from the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Microeconomic rigidities; Creative-destruction; Job security regulation; Adjustment costs; Rule of law; Productivity growth; Labor and Human Capital; E24; J23; J63; J64; K00.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28486
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Highway Franchising and Real Estate Values AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
It has become increasingly common to allocate highway franchises to the bidder that offers to charge the lowest toll. Often, building a highway increases the value of land held by a small group of developers, an effect that is more pronounced with lower tolls. We study the welfare implications of highway franchises that benefit large developers, focusing on the incentives developers have to internalize the effect of the toll they bid on the value of their land. We study how participation by developers in the auction affects equilibrium tolls and welfare. We find that large developers bid more aggressively than construction companies that own no land. As long as land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, allowing developers in the auction leads to lower...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demsetz auctions; Highway concessions; Private participation in infrastructure; Land Economics/Use; D44; H40; H54; R42; R48.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28523
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Microeconomic Flexibility in Latin America AgEcon
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Micco, Alejandro.
We characterize the degree of microeconomic inflexibility in several Latin American economies and find that Brazil, Chile and Colombia are more flexible than Mexico and Venezuela. The difference in flexibility among these economies is mainly explained by the behavior of large establishments, which adjust more promptly in the more flexible economies, especially when accumulated shocks are substantial. We also study the path of flexibility in Chile and show that it declined in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. This decline can account for a substantial fraction of the large decline in TFP-growth in Chile since 1997 (from 3.1 percent per year for the preceding decade, to about 0.3 percent after that). Moreover, if it were to persist, it could permanently...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Microeconomic rigidities; Creative-destruction; Job flows; Restructuring and reallocation; Productivity growth; Financial Economics; E2; J2; J6.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28527
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Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald.
The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Taxation; Mining; Rent extraction; Royalty; Non-renewable natural resource; Present-value-of-revenue auction; Public Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; Q33; Q34; Q38; H21; H25.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6390
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Price Stickiness in Ss Models: New Interpretations of Old Results AgEcon
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A..
What is the relation between infrequent price adjustment and the dynamic response of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks? The answer to this question ranges from a one-to-one link (Calvo, 1983) to no connection whatsoever (Caplin and Spulber, 1987). The purpose of this paper is to provide a unified framework to understand the mechanisms behind this wide range of results. In doing so, we propose new interpretations of key results in this area, which in turn suggest the kind of Ss model that is likely to generate substantial price rigidity. The first result we revisit is Caplin and Spulber's monetary neutrality model. We show that when price stickiness is measured in terms of the impulse response function, this result is not a consequence of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28423
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Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Is It Possible to Fix What Went Wrong? AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Based on evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, many of the standard benefits of privatization did not materialize because of pervasive contract renegotiations. We argue that the disappointing performance of highway privatization in Latin America was due to two fundamental design flaws. First, countries followed a “privatize now, regulate later” approach. Second, most concessions were awarded as a fixed-term franchise, thereby creating a demand for guarantees and contract...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Cost-of-funds; Flexibility; Franchising; Government subsidies; Present-value-of-revenue (PVR); Regulation; Renegotiation; Public Economics; H21; L51; L91.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28456
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Renegotiation Without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition's review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28382
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The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9280
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Three Strikes and You're Out: Reply to Cooper and Willis AgEcon
Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A..
Cooper and Willis (2003) is the latest in a sequence of criticisms of our methodology for estimating aggregate nonlinearities when microeconomic adjustment is lumpy. Their case is based on “reproducing” our main findings using artificial data generated by a model where microeconomic agents face quadratic adjustment costs. That is, they supposedly find our results where they should not be found. The three claims on which they base their case are incorrect. Their mistakes range from misinterpreting their own simulation results to failing to understand the context in which our procedures should be applied. They also claim that our approach assumes that employment decisions depend on the gap between the target and current level of unemployment. This is...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment hazard; Aggregate nonlinearities; Lumpy adjustment; Observed and unobserved gaps; Quadratic adjustment; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; E2; J2; J6.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28498
Registros recuperados: 12
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