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Collusion and seasonality of market price - A case of fixed market shares AgEcon
Bejger, Sylwester.
The paper develops a simple supergame model of collusion that focuses on the role of fixed (exogenous to game played) system of quantity market shares. Conclusions implied by the model could be used to motivate data - saving markers of collusion based on market price behavior. Following conclusions of the theoretical model we propose marker of collusion based on detecting changes in seasonal parameters of prices in periods of possible collusion. An empirical application of method has been done on well known data of Lysine cartel case.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Collusion; Repeated games; Fixed market shares; Seasonality of market price; Financial Economics; L11; L13; L41.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95962
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values AgEcon
Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668
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Patterns of Collusion in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program: An Empirical Analysis AgEcon
Rejesus, Roderick M.; Little, Bertis B.; Lovell, Ashley C.; Cross, Mike H.; Shucking, Michael.
This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log-linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Abuse; Collusion; Crop insurance; Empirical analysis; Fraud; Waste; G22; Q12; Q18; Q19.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43393
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Strategic Investment and Excess Capacity: A Study of the Taiwanese Flour Industry AgEcon
Ma, Tay-Cheng.
The Taiwanese flour industry’s capacity utilization rate has maintained an extremely low level of 40% for more than 20 years. This article sets up a two-stage game model and uses the strategic effect of the firm’s capital investment on its rivals’ outputs to explain the nature of this excess capacity. The model is tested with panel data from the Taiwanese flour industry by using non-linear three-stage least squares. The evidences indicate that a large capacity built in the past could have been used strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs, in the context of a concerted action among the incumbent firms.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Strategic investment; Two-stage game; Collusion; Conjectural variation; L13.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37516
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Two-Part Tariffs versus Linear Pricing Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Tests on Differentiated Products Markets AgEcon
Bonnet, Céline; Dubois, Pierre; Simioni, Michel.
We present a methodology allowing to introduce manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market. We consider in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part tariffs contracts and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed in two part tariffs contracts. Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models and two part tariffs. The methodology allows then to test between different hypothesis on the contracting and pricing relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry using exogenous variables supposed to shift the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Vertical contracts; Two part tariffs; Double marginalization; Collusion; Competition; Manufacturers; Retailers; Differentiated products; Water; Non nested tests; Industrial Organization; L13; L81; C12; C33.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25685
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WELFARE IMPROVING COLLUSION IN THE JAPANESE PORK IMPORT MARKET AgEcon
Fabiosa, Jacinto F..
Underlying parameter estimates suggest that reduction in pork exporters' profit is three times higher when the Japanese GATT safeguard is invoked, providing incentive to foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the trigger. This collusion is welfare-improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies. Workable and efficient allocation rules are constructed with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: GATT Safeguard; Gate price; Collusion; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21661
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Welfare-Improving Collusion in the Japanese Pork Import Market AgEcon
Fabiosa, Jacinto F..
Imports are increasingly becoming a significant source of Japan's pork supply. Japan's share of imports to total consumption increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1990, reaching a maximum of 44 percent in 1996. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard provisions for pork, Japan can raise its gate price by 24 percent when imports in a given quarter are 119 percent higher than the average imports of the last three years of the same quarter. Japan has already invoked the safeguard provision twice since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) was signed in 1995. In both cases, the level and volatility of retail prices increased; the CIF values of imports increased, making the impact on the government of Japan (GOJ) tax revenue...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Collusion; International agricultural trade; Policy analysis; Welfare; International Relations/Trade; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18491
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