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EXISTE DIFERENÇA ENTRE A RENTABILIDADE DAS AÇÕES DAS EMPRESAS QUE ADOTAM GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA COM RELAÇÃO ÀS EMPRESAS DO MERCADO TRADICIONAL? AgEcon
Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully; Bressan, Aureliano Angel.
The study verifies, between march 2005 and march 2006, if there is any difference between the stock yields of a sample of companies listed in Bovespa that adopt the principles of Corporate Governance, in different levels, in relation to the companies of the traditional market. The data were extracted from Economatica’s database; 130 non-financial companies with higher liquidity stock were selected, of which 65 adopt Corporate Governance practices, and 65 operate according to the traditional market. To conduct the study, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Student’s t test were used. The results show that the mean yield of companies that adopt different Corporate Governance levels was superior to that of the companies which did not adopt these practices....
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Stock Yield; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Agricultural Finance.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60711
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Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares AgEcon
Lauterbach, Beni; Yafeh, Yishay.
We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting rights they incurred upon unification by: 1) increasing their holdings prior to the unification (ex-ante preparation), and 2) by buying shares afterwards; by the end of the sample period their voting power was only marginally lower than in the control sample. This suggests that marginal voting rights are important to controlling shareholders even beyond the 50% threshold. Second, share unifications were not associated with...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Dual Class Shares; Corporate Governance; Financial Economics; G30; G32.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55833
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? AgEcon
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, Alexander.
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the board’s performance expectations and ‘soft’ information about board and CEO actions and the board’s beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board’s expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corporate Governance; Large Shareholders; Boards of Directors; CEO Turnover; Legal Reforms; Transition Economies; Private Equity; Financial Economics; G34; G24; G32; K22; O16; P21.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60665
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