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AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AgEcon
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..
The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earth’s fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353
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Cairo Evaluation Clinic: Thoughts on Randomized Trials for Evaluation of Development AgEcon
Karlan, Dean S..
We were asked to discuss specific methodological approaches to evaluating three hypothetical interventions. This article uses this forum to discuss three misperceptions about randomized trials. First, nobody argues that randomized trials are appropriate in all settings, and for all questions. Everyone agrees that asking the right question is the highest priority. Second, the decision about what to measure and how to measure it, i.e., through qualitative or participatory methods versus quantitative survey or administrative data methods, is independent of the decision about whether to conduct a randomized trial. Third, randomized trials can be used to evaluate complex and dynamic processes, not just simple and static interventions. Evaluators should aim...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Program evaluation; Randomized control trial; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Labor and Human Capital; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; B41; O12; H43; J08; H54; D73; D12.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51913
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Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure AgEcon
Hefeker, Carsten; Michaelowa, Katharina.
Can process conditionality really enhance poverty reduction in developing countries? This question is addressed in the framework of a politico-economic model considering political distortions both on the recipient and on the donor side. It turns out that process conditionality is a very useful tool to raise the welfare of the poor as long as the international aid organizations hold all necessary information to assess the political situation in recipient countries and to select the true representatives of the poor into a participatory process. If they do not hold this information or if other bureaucratic interests reduce their incentive to acquire this information, process conditionality loses its effectiveness in achieving the desired objective.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Poverty reduction; Process conditionality; Political economy of international organizations.; Food Security and Poverty; Political Economy; D72; D73; F35; O19.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26389
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Clean or “Dirty” Energy: Evidence on a Renewable Energy Resource Curse AgEcon
Gennaioli, Caterina; Tavoni, Massimo.
The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector. Taking a political economy approach, we analyze the link between public support schemes for renewable energy and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. The insights of a model of political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using a panel data of Italian provinces for the period 1990-2007. We find evidence that a curse exists in the case of wind energy, and specifically that: i) criminal association activity increased more in high-wind provinces and especially after the introduction of a more favourable public policy regime and, ii) the expansion of the wind energy sector has been driven by both the wind level...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Natural Resources Curse; Wind Energy; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; O13; P16.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115846
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Corruption, Income Inequality, and Poverty in the United States AgEcon
Dincer, Oguzhan C.; Gunalp, Burak.
In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Our analysis advances the existing literature in four ways. First, instead of using corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we use all commonly used inequality and poverty measures including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, standard deviation of the logarithms, relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and the poverty rate defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Third, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise due to data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality, and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Income Inequality; Poverty; D31; D73; I32.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37848
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Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and Corruption AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Democracy; Income inequality; Property rights; Political Economy; D73; H11; P16.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99685
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LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA AgEcon
Zhang, Xiaobo; Fan, Shenggen; Zhang, Linxiu; Huang, Jikun.
In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance structure is a key issue and, increasingly, empirical evaluation of the effects of democratization on the provision of local public goods is needed. Since the early 1990s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local-government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this paper compares governance by elected officials with that of appointed cadres and finds that elected officials tend to tax constituents less and provide them with higher levels of public services.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Governance; Democracy; Public goods provision; China; Public Economics; D73; H41; P35.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/16120
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Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes AgEcon
Chong, Alberto E.; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; Wantchekon, Leonard.
Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are...
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640
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PRIMARY DETERMINANTS AND THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CORRUPTION AgEcon
Ortega, David L.; Florax, Raymond J.G.M.; Delbecq, Benoit A..
This paper analyzes the spatial distribution of corruption and its primary economic and political determinants. Economic freedom and development are found to lower incidences of corruption. Of notable significance, this study finds empirical evidence of a non-linear relationship between a country’s level of democracy and corruption. Extreme authoritarian regimes are found to have lower corruption levels than hybrid regimes, but past a certain threshold democracy inhibits corruption. More importantly the analysis in this paper finds that the economic and political actions of a country have a significant impact on corruption levels worldwide.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Spatial econometrics; Economic freedom; Political democracy; Political Economy; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C21; D73; H11.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101395
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Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions AgEcon
Hefeker, Carsten.
The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group. Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government, international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic selfinterest, and whether this distort policies.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Aid policy; Conditionality; International financial institution; Interest groups; D73; F35; O23; Financial Economics; Political Economy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26381
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Social Capital and Political Accountability AgEcon
Nannicini, Tommaso; Stella, Andrea; Tabellini, Guido; Troiano, Ugo.
Replaced with revised version of paper 02/05/12.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Capital; Culture; Political Agency; Labor and Human Capital; D72; D73; Z10.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90944
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The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States AgEcon
Guerriero, Carmine.
Replaced with revised version of paper 10/14/08.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive Schemes; Accountability Rules; Regulatory Capture; D73; H11; L51; K2.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36755
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The Rule of The Jungle in Pakistan: A Case Study on Corruption and Forest Management in Swat AgEcon
Pellegrini, Lorenzo.
Corruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible solutions. As we highlight in this study, the ‘crime and punishment’ approach is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden centralised forest management regime, institutional reform should move away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal management of natural...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Forest management; Environmental policy; Institutional reform; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; Q24; Q57.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7439
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Transfer of Institutions: Actors and Constraints - The Russian Case in a Global Context AgEcon
Oleinik, Anton.
Modernity is usually thought as a complex society with clearly differentiated spheres of everyday life. It means, in particular, that economic rules do not interfere with the norms structuring political, social, scientific and other interactions. The complex, differentiated society sharply contrasts with a "small" and homogeneous "pre-modern" society. The process of modernization, i.e. differentiation of the spheres of everyday life, can take various forms. In an advanced country it relies on internal forces. Modernization in this context looks like an evolutionary, "bottom-up" development. In a backward country (Russia and Germany in the first half of the 20th century), modernization requires a strong governmental (from the top to the bottom)...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: State bureaucracy; Economic backwardness; Catch-up modernization; Conservative modernization; Opportunism; Institutional constraints; Power; Authority; Invidious comparison; Institutional importation; Democracy; Shared mental model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; A14; B15; B25; B52; D73; H83; K42; N40; O17; P21; P37; P51.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26333
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What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation - AgEcon
Michaelowa, Katharina; Borrmann, Axel.
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176
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What Motivates Farms to Associate? The Case of Two Competing Czech Agricultural Associations AgEcon
Bavorova, Miroslava; Curtiss, Jarmila.
The study investigates determinants of affiliation with the two strongest associations in Czech agriculture. These represent Agricultural Association grouping large-scale enterprises and Association of Private Farmers, respectively. Our objective is to analyze whether associations with different types of members (large-scale enterprises vs. private farmers) experience different motives for joining or lapsing. Moreover, we investigate if there are characteristics of the associations' members which positively correlate to membership. The results imply that political lobbying is the main entry incentive for both large-scale enterprises and individual farmers. Informal information exchange is a more significant motivation for private farmers than for...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Associations; Agricultural enterprises; Czech agriculture; Selective incentives; Individual farms; Transition; Farm Management; D71; D72; D73; L14; L21; L22; C35.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25770
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