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Registros recuperados: 9
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Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services AgEcon
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto.
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547
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DEATH (MACHINES) AND TAXES AgEcon
Lipow, Jonathan; Plessner, Yakir.
In the defense policy literature, it is widely believed that there is a pronounced bias towards the procurement of a less than optimal number of excessively sophisticated weapons. In this paper, we consider the possibility that this perceived bias is the result of the timing and informational structure of defense procurement decisions, and the inter-relationship of this structure with overall fiscal policy. Specifically, this paper presents a model that suggests that tax smoothing considerations of the type first articulated in Barro (1979) could lead social welfare maximizing decision makers to choose a higher level of weapon quality than would be optimal if government revenue could be raised without resort to distortionary taxation.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Defense procurement; Weapon quality; Tax smoothing; Public Economics; H57.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7136
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Demystifying the German "Armament Miracle" During World War II. New Insights from the Annual Audits of German Aircraft Producers AgEcon
Budrass, Lutz; Scherner, Jonas; Streb, Jochen.
Armament minister Albert Speer is usually credited with causing the boom in German armament production after 1941. This paper uses the annual audit reports of the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand AG for seven firms which together represented about 50 % of the German aircraft producers. We question the received view by showing that in the German aircraft industry the crucial changes that triggered the upswing in aircraft production already occurred before World War II. The government decided in 1938 that aircraft producers had to concentrate on a few different types, and in 1937 that cost-plus contracts were replaced with fixed price contracts. What followed was not a sudden production miracle but a continuous development which was fuelled first by learning...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: German armament miracle; World War II; Albert Speer; Aircraft industry; Learning-by-doing; Fixed-price contract; Labor productivity; Political Economy; H57; L64; N44.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28473
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Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits? AgEcon
Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.
Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883
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"It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; Vergalli, Sergio.
We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public Procurement Contracts; Penalty Fee; Investment Timing Flexibility; Contract Incompleteness; Enforceability of Rules; Financial Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54351
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Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping AgEcon
Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino.
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370
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Prescriptive use of Environmental Indices: A "How To" Guide for Conservation Programs AgEcon
Cattaneo, Andrea.
A framework for analyzing conservation programs that rank applications using environmental indices is presented. We derive the optimal bid from the farmer's perspective for both land retirement and working lands agri-environmental payment programs and we analyze how these solutions depend on program design parameters. The distinction is made between environmental objectives based on whether the farmer exercises control or not over the level proposed in a bid to participate in a program. The optimization model is solved analytically for two cases - a land retirement and a working lands program - highlighting the differences in the results.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental payments; Program design; Participation incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy; C6; H57; Q21; Q28.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24764
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The Determinants of Suppliers’ Performance in E-Procurement: Evidence from the Italian Government’s E-Procurement Platform AgEcon
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto; Fana, Marta.
Participation of small businesses in the market for public contracts is widely recognized as a key policy issue. It is also commonly held that the adoption of e-procurement solutions can be effective in pursuing such an objective. To this end, we analyze the transactions completed in the period 2004-2007 through the Italian Government’s e-procurement platform, that is, the marketplace managed by the Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.). Although descriptive statistics indicate that micro suppliers are the most represented group of firms in the marketplace, our econometric treatment provides some evidence that the former are less successful than all other suppliers in getting public contracts. Degree of loyalty with buyers, location and the use...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: E-Procurement; Small Suppliers; Request For Quotations; Performance; Public Contracts; Count Data; D44; H57; C16; C25; L25.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37672
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Time is Money: Optimal Investment Delay in Procurement (and Concession) Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola.
Procurement (and concession) contracts are agreements granting the right to construct public works, operate and provide a service/good. The main advantage of a procurement contract is that it passes full responsibility for investment and operations to the private sector and consequently provides incentives for efficiency. Although most contracts include penalty/premium clauses to avoid construction risks (i.e. delays), evidence from ongoing procurement contracts shows that there are many delays in making investments. Actually these clauses introduce the flexibility to decide when it is optimal to invest and consequently increase the contract’s value for the contractor. Therefore if the contracting authority underestimates penalty/premium fees, these may be...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Procurement/concession contracts; Premium/penalty fee; Investment timing flexibility; Public Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6642
Registros recuperados: 9
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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