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Registros recuperados: 6
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Contracting with Smallholders under Joint Liability AgEcon
Kaminski, Jonathan.
Replaced with revised version of paper Jan. 11, 2012
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contract farming; Moral hazard; Joint liability; Peer monitoring; Agricultural Finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D82; L14; 013; Q13.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93128
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Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi AgEcon
Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander.
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper investigates the determinants of moral hazard among JLL schemes from Malawi, using group level data from 99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the extent of matching problems explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups. The implications are that Joint Liability Lending institutions will continue to rely on social cohesion and...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Moral hazard; Joint liability; Dynamic incentives; Group lending; Malawi; Financial Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25287
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Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S..
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Microenterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50951
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Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups AgEcon
Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean.
Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Microfinance; Group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Micro-enterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D71; D82; D91; G21; O12; O16; O17.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/229136
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How Important are Peer Effects in Group Lending? Estimating a Static Game of Incomplete Information AgEcon
Li, Shanjun; Liu, Yanyan; Deininger, Klaus W..
We quantify the importance of peer effects in group lending by estimating a static game of incomplete information. In our model, group members make their repayment decisions simultaneously based on their household and loan characteristics as well as their expectations on other members’ repayment decisions. Exploiting a rich data set of a microfinance program in India, our estimation results suggest that the likelihood of a member making a full repayment would be 15 percent higher on average if all the other follow members make full repayment compared to the case where none of the other members repay in full. We also find that large inconsistencies exist in the estimated effects of other variables in models that do not incorporate peer effects and control...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Peer effects; Group lending; Joint liability; Self-help groups in India; International Development.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49497
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The Impact of Group-Based Credit on Demand for Productive Inputs and Agricultural Productivity in Rural Kenya AgEcon
Mghenyi, Elliot W..
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural credit; Joint liability; Productive inputs; Productivity; Agricultural Finance; International Development; Productivity Analysis; Risk and Uncertainty; D24; Q14; R34.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49470
Registros recuperados: 6
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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