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Registros recuperados: 12
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Capital Structure and Regulation: Does Ownership Matter? AgEcon
Bortolotti, Bernardo; Cambini, Carlo; Rondi, Laura; Spiegel, Yossi.
We construct a comprehensive panel data of 96 publicly traded European utilities over the period 1994-2005 in order to study the relationship between the capital structure of regulated firms, regulated prices, and investments, and examine if and how this interaction is affected by ownership structure. We show that firms in our sample increase their leverage after becoming regulated by an independent regulatory agency, but only if they are privately controlled. Moreover, we find that the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on regulated prices, but not vice versa, and it also has a positive and significant effect on their investment levels. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately-controlled firms use leverage...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulated utilities; Regulatory agencies; Capital structure; Leverage; Investment; Private and state ownership; Public Economics; L51; G31; G32; L33.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7449
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Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter? AgEcon
Zhang, Yingang; Parker, David; Kirkpatrick, Colin.
Recent years have seen countries introducing reform of their utility industries with a view to promoting private ownership and competition. This paper studies the effect of the sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985 to 2001. A fixed effects panel data model is used. The study finds that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, improved capital utilisation.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Privatisation; Competition; Regulation; Developing economies; Economic performance.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L33; L43; L44; L50; 012; O38; O50.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30599
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Creating the Conditions for International Business Expansion: The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries - A Cross-Country Analysis AgEcon
Jililian, Hossein; Kirkpatrick, Colin; Parker, David.
The role of an effective regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development and therefore international business has generated considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent years. In particular, building effective regulatory structures in developing countries is not simply an issue of the technical design of the most appropriate regulatory instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting regulatory institutions and capacity. Many of the institutions that support markets are publicly provided and the effectiveness of these regulatory institutions can be expected to be an important determinant of how well markets function. This paper explores the role of regulation in affecting economic outcomes using an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Economic growth; Regulation; Governance; Institutions; Economic performance; International Development; C23; I18; L33; L51; L98; O38; O50.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30554
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Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence from Local Public Transport in Europe AgEcon
Boitani, Andrea; Nicolini, Marcella; Scarpa, Carlo.
This paper investigates how the ownership and the procedure for the selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, we carry out a comparative analysis of 72 companies operating in large European cities. This allows us to consider firms selected either through competitive tendering or negotiated procedures. The analysis of the data on 77 European firms over the period 1997-2006 indicates that firms operate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain a measure of total factor productivity, which we regress on firm and city characteristics. We find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Local Public Transport; Public Ownership; Translog Production Function; Financial Economics; C33; K23; L25; L33; L91.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59392
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How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts AgEcon
Walls, Margaret.
Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How should contracts be structured to provide incentives for recycling? Who should own key facilities, such as recyclable materials processing facilities? Should a separate contract for processing and sale of materials be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These questions are addressed in this study using the principal-agent framework and the theory of incomplete contracts in economics. I explain stylized...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive contracts; Asset specificity; Principal-agent models; Waste collection; Recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; L33; L14; Q2.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10707
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Impacto de la privatización sobre el desempeño de las empresas en el Perú AgEcon
Torero, Maximo.
Casi diez años después de la privatización de importantes empresas estatales (EE) del Perú, el balance a priori aún no es claro. En el presente estudio se analiza el impacto de la privatización mediante un detallado análisis estadístico y econométrico. En primer lugar, mediante varios indicadores de rentabilidad, eficiencia de operación, empleo, solvencia y convergencia, se realiza un análisis de primeras diferencias entre el desempeño previo y posterior a la privatización de las empresas. Asimismo, se efectúa un análisis de segundas diferencias mediante la comparación del cambio en el desempeño de las empresas privatizadas antes y después de la privatización respecto al cambio en el desempeño de las EE. Los resultados muestran que las empresas privadas...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Empresas públicas; Privatización; Perú; Public enterprises; Privatization; Peru; L33.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37749
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"It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola; Vergalli, Sergio.
We provide a general framework in which to determine the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of investment timing flexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation on PPCs. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian PPCs are due to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations of delays in Italian PPCs: specifically, we extend our model to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public Procurement Contracts; Penalty Fee; Investment Timing Flexibility; Contract Incompleteness; Enforceability of Rules; Financial Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54351
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Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt AgEcon
Cambini, Carlo; Rondi, Laura.
This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government’s political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulated Utilities; Investment; Capital Structure; Private and State Ownership; Regulatory Independence; Government’s Political Orientation; Financial Economics; G31; G32; L33; L51; L90.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91002
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Revisiting the “cotton problem”: A comparative analysis of cotton reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa AgEcon
Delpeuch, Claire; Vandeplas, Anneleen; Swinnen, Johan F.M..
The cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in West and Central Africa (WCA), and still is to a large extent, despite repeated reform recommendations by international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylized contracting model to investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton sectors and analyze the potential consequences of orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government intervention, the degree of post-reform competition, as well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive (but not less pressing) to farmers...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Sub-Saharan Africa; Cotton reforms; Self-enforcing contracts; International Development; Q12; L33; O12.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91806
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Revisiting the “Cotton Problem”: A comparative analysis of cotton reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa AgEcon
Delpeuch, Claire; Vandeplas, Anneleen; Swinnen, Johan F.M..
The cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in Africa, and still is to a large extent in West and Central Africa (WCA), despite repeated reform recommendations by international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylized contracting model to investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton sectors and analyze the potential consequences of orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government intervention, the degree of post-reform competition, as well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive (but not less pressing)...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Sub-Saharan Africa; Cotton reforms; Self-enforcing contracts; Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q12; L33; O12.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/62042
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Revisiting the "Cotton Problem:" A Comparative Analysis of Cotton Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa AgEcon
Delpeuch, Claire; Vandeplas, Anneleen; Swinnen, Johan F.M..
The cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in Africa, and still is to a large extent in West and Central Africa (WCA), despite repeated reform recommendations by international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylized contracting model to investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton sectors and analyze the potential consequences of orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government intervention, the degree of post-reform competition, as well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive (but not less pressing)...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Sub-Saharan Africa; Cotton reforms; Self-enforcing contracts; Crop Production/Industries; Q12; L33; O12.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96176
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Time is Money: Optimal Investment Delay in Procurement (and Concession) Contracts AgEcon
D'Alpaos, Chiara; Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola.
Procurement (and concession) contracts are agreements granting the right to construct public works, operate and provide a service/good. The main advantage of a procurement contract is that it passes full responsibility for investment and operations to the private sector and consequently provides incentives for efficiency. Although most contracts include penalty/premium clauses to avoid construction risks (i.e. delays), evidence from ongoing procurement contracts shows that there are many delays in making investments. Actually these clauses introduce the flexibility to decide when it is optimal to invest and consequently increase the contract’s value for the contractor. Therefore if the contracting authority underestimates penalty/premium fees, these may be...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Procurement/concession contracts; Premium/penalty fee; Investment timing flexibility; Public Economics; L33; H57; D81.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6642
Registros recuperados: 12
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