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A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory AgEcon
Dharmapala, Dhammika; Hoffmann, Sandra A.; Schwartz, Warren.
The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, misperception, or error) all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both injurers and victims. This paper generalizes the standard model to consider situations in which one party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's effort or cost of taking precaution. If the injurer's care affects the victim's precaution costs (but not vice versa), most of the standard results continue to hold (except for strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence). If the victims precaution affects the injurers costs of care (but not vice versa), only strict liability with a defense of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Law and economics; Tort laws; Risk and Uncertainty; K13; K00.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10626
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How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare? AgEcon
Desquilbet, Marion; Poret, Sylvaine.
This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effect of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcome. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their cost savings from GMO adoption. Producers of non-GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields makes its GMO content above the labeling threshold. The government may impose to GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non-GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Genetically modified organisms; Coexistence; Identity preservation; Regulation; Liability; Vertical differentiation; Law and economics; Marketing; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114757
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Is Posner's Principle of Justice an Adequate Basis for Environmental Law? AgEcon
Tisdell, Clement A..
Posner adopted the economic principle of wealth maximization as a guiding principle for the dispensation of justice. This resulted in his endorsing the Kaldor-Hicks principle (also known as the potential Paretian improvement principle) as a basis for just laws. This article explores whether this principle is an adequate basis for environmental law. As can be deduced from Fleming, the legal approach adopted by Posner is by no means new because early British tort law was applied in a manner intended to foster economic growth. Nevertheless, the wealth maximization principle is not adequate as a basis for just environmental laws because for one thing it ignores questions involving changes in income distribution. Consequently, Rawls’ principle of justice is...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Coase theorem; Law and economics; Posner’s principle of justice; Principles of justice; Property rights; Rawls’ principle of justice; Tort law; Welfare economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; K; K1. K11. K13; K32; Q5.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55337
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