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Registros recuperados: 30
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A Cost Function Analysis of Crop Insurance Moral Hazard and Agricultural Chemical Use AgEcon
Liang, Yan; Coble, Keith H..
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in cotton buy-up insurance. The trans-log cost function estimates of the own-price elasticity of fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide is -0.222, -0.143, and -0.121, respectively for Mississippi cotton production. Our results found statistically significant relationship between per acre direct cost and cotton buy-up insurance for year 2001 and 2005 in Mississippi. Our results also indicate that moral hazard can either decrease or increase agricultural input usage depending specific production condition in an individual year. But in general the results support effects smaller than anecdotal evidence would suggest.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Crop insurance; Moral hazard; Agricultural input use; Cost function analysis; Cotton; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; Production Economics; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49485
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A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response AgEcon
Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D.; Wolf, Christopher A..
This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19200
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A model-based approach to moral hazard in food chains - What contribution do principal-agent-models make to the understanding of food risks induced by opportunistic behaviour? AgEcon
Hirschauer, Norbert.
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunistic behaviour of upstream sellers who exploit the fact that many food product qualities remain uncertain to downstream buyers in the course of conventional market transactions (credence qualities). Due to this lack of market transparency buyers run the risk to pay premium prices for inferior products (quality risks); furthermore, they run the risk to use or consume substances which are harmful (health risks). Therefore, they will want to design optimal contracts and controls preventing opportunistic behaviour. Usually, however, buyers cannot contract contingent on the actions of upstream sellers because they cannot observe them directly (information asymmetry). Motivated by the obviously...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food risk; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Opportunistic behaviour; Prevention; Principal-agent-model; Traceability; Agribusiness; Farm Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97448
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Agri-Environmental Policy and Moral Hazard under Output Price and Production Uncertainty AgEcon
Yano, Yuki; Blandford, David.
Several theoretical and empirical models have been developed to examine how risk aversion affects compliance with agri-environmental schemes under asymmetric information and uncertainty. However, none has examined the case where the level of compliance is a continuous variable and producers face simultaneous monitoring, output price and production uncertainty. Treating conservation effort as a continuous variable, we show that risk aversion can mitigate the moral hazard problem in most cases. However, if conservation effort has a risk-increasing impact on production the effect of risk aversion on compliance is ambiguous.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental schemes; Uncertainty; Moral hazard; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44323
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Aligning Incentives for Accelerated Heifer Growth in Custom Heifer Growing Contracts AgEcon
Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A..
Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because of hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms which provide incentives for the custom heifer grower to perform accelerated growth without heifers becoming over-conditioned. In order to provide incentives to custom growers, heifers returned to the dairy farm should be compared in performance to other heifers of similar age. We solve for the price paid per pound of gain, price paid for inch...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farm management; Production economics; Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6077
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Aligning Incentives for Contract Dairy Heifer Growth AgEcon
Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A..
As dairy farms grow and specialize in milking cows, raising replacement heifers is increasingly outsourced. Perhaps the largest challenge of outsourcing the heifer enterprise involves quality, measured as milk production potential, and the possibility for moral hazard due to hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms to provide incentives for the heifer grower to achieve desired growth rates, and enable the return of the heifer to the dairy farm on an accelerated time frame, without sacrificing quality. To mitigate incentive asymmetries, bonuses and deductions are proposed.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99109
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An Interdisciplinary Approach to White-collar Crime in the Food Sector AgEcon
Hirschauer, Norbert; Musshoff, Oliver; Scheerer, Sebastian.
The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of purchased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through opportunistic behaviour. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers' social contexts - such as values, emotional bonds etc. - that shield them from yielding to economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which combines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theories). The approach is discussed with...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Behavioural food risks; Control theories; Game theory; Moral hazard; Opportunistic malpractice; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; K32; K42.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25688
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Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement AgEcon
Bardsley, Peter; Burfurd, Ingrid.
Market based instruments are proving increasingly effective in biodiversity procurement and in regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design may differ significantly between procurement and regulatory policy environments.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Procurement; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Contract theory.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48047
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Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases AgEcon
Yoder, Jonathan K.; Hossain, Ishrat; Epplin, Francis M.; Doye, Damona G..
Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contract costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual versus multiyear contracts.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Land lease contracts; Moral hazard; Contract duration; Division of labor; Labor and Human Capital; Land Economics/Use; J43; L23; Q15.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12962
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Contracting with Smallholders under Joint Liability AgEcon
Kaminski, Jonathan.
Replaced with revised version of paper Jan. 11, 2012
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contract farming; Moral hazard; Joint liability; Peer monitoring; Agricultural Finance; Consumer/Household Economics; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D82; L14; 013; Q13.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93128
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Contracts for Grain Biosecurity and Grain Quality AgEcon
Abougamos, Hoda; White, Benedict; Sadler, Rohan.
The export of grain from Western Australia depends upon a grain supply network that takes grain from farm to port through Cooperative Bulk Handling receival and storage sites. The ability of the network to deliver pest free grain to the port and onto ship depends upon the quality of grain delivered by farmers and the efficacy of phosphine based fumigation in controlling stored grain pests. Phosphine fumigation is critical to the grain supply network because it is the cheapest effective fumigant. In addition, it is also residue free. Unfortunately, over time, common stored-grain pests have evolved to develop resistance to phosphine and there is a risk that phosphine will become less effective and may need to be replaced with more expensive alternative...
Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Supply contracts; Moral hazard; Stored grain; Biosecurity; Crop Production/Industries.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124216
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COOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AgEcon
Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G..
Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails to attract non-farm or "private" investment? We hypothesize that farm capital is high cost, relative to that provided by private entrepreneurs (or in other words, that there is a degree of asset fixity in farm capital) but that it engenders greater organizational commitment-which is particularly important when expected market returns are low-on the part of producers. This commitment arises from the indirect incentive properties associated with at-risk capital. We...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate financing; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18478
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Cooperative Formation and Financial Contracting in Agricultural Markets AgEcon
Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G..
Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that fails to attract non-farm, or "private" investment? We hypothesize that doing so is a costly mechanism for increasing the maximum penalty farmers face in the case of business failure. For a given market environment, exposing farmers to this risk increases the amount of surplus that can be used to repay lenders, thus expanding the set of market environments in which financing is available. We show how equity investment of this sort can be an efficient organizational response to a...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate finance; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness; Marketing.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18610
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Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi AgEcon
Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander.
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper investigates the determinants of moral hazard among JLL schemes from Malawi, using group level data from 99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the extent of matching problems explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups. The implications are that Joint Liability Lending institutions will continue to rely on social cohesion and...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Moral hazard; Joint liability; Dynamic incentives; Group lending; Malawi; Financial Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25287
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Does Information Change Behavior? AgEcon
Huffman, Wallace E..
This paper reviews and synthesizes the theory of information economics and empirical evidence on how information changes the behavior of consumers, households and firms. I show that consumers respond to new information in food experiments but perhaps not in retirement account management. Some seeming perverse consumer/investor decision making may be a result of a complex decision with a low expected payoff.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Information economics; Consumer behavior; Behavioral economics; Moral hazard; Adverse selection.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55938
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Feasibility of the Income Stabilisation Tool in Finland AgEcon
Liesivaara, Petri; Myyra, Sami; Jaakkola, Antti.
Whole-farm income insurances are promoted in the new post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The current Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) scheme in Finland covers crop failure for farmers who have suffered losses and applied for the payments. This paper analyses the use of the Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) and compares it to the current CDC scheme in Finland. The Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is used to simulate the costs of IST compensation payments. Special attention is paid to pig farms and their possibilities to manipulate the IST. Results show that the IST is triggered with a high frequency on Finnish farms. The IST would be more costly than the current CDC programme. The results also suggest that the IST would act as an income...
Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Income stabilization tool; Moral hazard; Farm Accountancy Data Network; Farm Management; Risk and Uncertainty; Q14.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122537
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Moral hazard and the division of labor in agricultural land leases AgEcon
Hossain, Ishrat; Yoder, Jonathan K.; Epplin, Francis M.; Doye, Damona G..
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Land lease contracts; Moral hazard; Contract duration; Division of labor; Land Economics/Use.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59366
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Moral Hazard in a Mutual Health-Insurance System: German Knappschaften, 1867-1914 AgEcon
Guinnane, Timothy W.; Streb, Jochen.
This paper studies moral hazard in a sickness-insurance fund that provided the model for social-insurance schemes around the world. The German Knappschaften were formed in the medieval period to provide sickness, accident, and death benefits for miners. By the mid-nineteenth century, participation in the Knappschaft was compulsory for workers in mines and related occupations, and the range and generosity of benefits had expanded considerably. Each Knappschaft was locally controlled and self-funded, and their admirers saw in them the ability to use local knowledge and good incentives to deliver benefits at low cost. The Knappschaft underlies Bismarck’s sickness and accident insurance legislation (1883 and 1884), which in turn forms the basis of the German...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Sickness insurance; Moral hazard; Knappschaft; Social insurance; Health Economics and Policy; Political Economy; Public Economics; N33; N43; H55; H53; I18.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54533
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Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden AgEcon
Karp, Larry S..
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ambient tax; Nonpoint source pollution; Moral hazard; Asymmetric information; Differential games; Environmental Economics and Policy; D82; H20; H40; Q20.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25100
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Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment AgEcon
Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan.
Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the empirical importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major South African lender along three dimensions: 1) the initial "offer interest rate" appearing on direct mail solicitations; 2) a "contract interest rate" equal to or less than the offer interest rate and revealed to the over 4,000 borrowers who agreed to the initial offer rate; and 3) a dynamic repayment incentive that extends preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remain in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Information asymmetries; Field experiment; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Development finance; Credit markets; Microfinance; Financial Economics; C9; D8; G2; G3; O1.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28482
Registros recuperados: 30
Primeira ... 12 ... Última
 

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