| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE
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| Autores: |
Centner, Terence J.
Griffin, Ronald C.
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| Data: |
2003-12-17
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| Ano: |
1998
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| Palavras-chave: |
Livestock Production/Industries
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| Resumo: |
Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.
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| Tipo: |
Journal Article
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
11401
http://purl.umn.edu/31183
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 23, Number 01, July 1998
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| Formato: |
14
application/pdf
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