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Provedor de dados:  31
País:  United States
Título:  Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion
Autores:  Fumagalli, Chiara
Motta, Massimo
Ronde, Thomas
Data:  2010-01-04
Ano:  2009
Palavras-chave:  Monopolization Practices
Vertical Agreements
Financial Economics
L12
L40
L42
Resumo:  This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
Tipo:  Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma:  Inglês
Identificador:  http://purl.umn.edu/56213
Relação:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Institutions and Markets Papers
IM
120.2009
Formato:  39
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