| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements
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| Autores: |
Karp, Larry S.
Lee, In Ho
Mason, Robin
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| Data: |
2006-02-06
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| Ano: |
2003
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| Palavras-chave: |
Global games
Congestion
Coordination problem
International Relations/Trade
C79
D84
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| Resumo: |
We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agents payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
19770
http://purl.umn.edu/25014
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
University of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers
CUDARE Working Paper 940
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| Formato: |
23
application/pdf
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