| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE PRICING OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THE CASE OF UNMETERED WATER; Proceedings of the Fifth Joint Conference on Agriculture, Food, and the Environment, June 17-18, 1996, Padova, Italy
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| Autores: |
Smith, Rodney B.W.
Tsur, Yacov
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| Data: |
2004-02-19
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| Ano: |
1996
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| Palavras-chave: |
Resource /Energy Economics and Policy
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| Resumo: |
This paper uses mechanism design theory to (i) propose a mechanism to price irrigation water when farmers are heterogeneous in their production technologies (adverse selection) and their individual water uses are unobserved (moral hazard) and (ii) discusses briefly when such a mechanism might be economically unreasonable. Unmetered irrigation water is often priced by imposing per-acre fees on cultivated acreage or by charging per-unit fees on observable inputs or outputs. The offered pricing procedure is based on the observed output and achieves a first-best outcome when implementation is free of transaction costs.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
12507
http://purl.umn.edu/14368
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
University of Minnesota>Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy>Working Papers
Working Paper WP96-04, Session VI, Paper 2
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| Formato: |
16
application/pdf
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