| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Favoritism and allocative efficiency: a game theoretic approach
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| Autores: |
Farida, Moe
Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z.
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| Data: |
2009-03-11
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| Ano: |
2009
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| Palavras-chave: |
Favoritism
Allocative efficiency
Bribery game.
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| Resumo: |
This paper seeks to investigate the interaction between favoritism and allocative efficiency. The issue of whether corruption distorts allocative efficiency in a bribery game under a pre-existing environment of alleged favoritism is considered. It is demonstrated that if there is no unambiguous favoritism, observed favoritism in bribery game may disrupt allocative efficiency. A bribery game under corruption and favoritism is developed. The model and some possible equilibria are discussed. A simple numerical example from Lebanon is also presented.
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| Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/48156
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| Relação: |
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society>2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia
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| Formato: |
21
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