| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
(Anti-) Coordination in Networks
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| Autores: |
Kovarik, Jaromir
Mengel, Friederike
Romero, Jose Gabriel
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| Data: |
2010-05-03
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| Ano: |
2010
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| Palavras-chave: |
Game Theory
Networks
Coordination Problems
Experiments
Risk and Uncertainty
C72
C90
C91
D85
|
| Resumo: |
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are such that all links are coordinated. As a second treatment variation we let agents decide endogenously on the amount of information they would like to have and find that local (endogenous) information is equally efficient in ensuring successful coordination as full information. We provide an intuitive explanation of these facts which is supported by our data.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/61370
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| Relação: |
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Sustainable Development Papers
SD
49.2010
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| Formato: |
33
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