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Provedor de dados:  31
País:  United States
Título:  Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality
Autores:  Beard, Rodney
Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
Salerno, Gillian
Data:  2007-04-11
Ano:  2007
Palavras-chave:  Game theory
Public choice
Imperfect public monitoring
Imperfect private monitoring
Non-point source pollution
Agricultural extension
Public education
Environmental Economics and Policy
Resumo:  In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.
Tipo:  Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma:  Inglês
Identificador:  25655

http://purl.umn.edu/10391
Editor:  AgEcon Search
Relação:  Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - 2007>2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand
Conference Paper
Formato:  32

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