| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
|
| País: |
United States
|
| Título: |
Information Asymmetry and the Problem of Transfers in Trade Negotiations and International Agencies
|
| Autores: |
Hamada, Koichi
Sunder, Shyam
|
| Data: |
2006-01-27
|
| Ano: |
2005
|
| Palavras-chave: |
International trade
Tariff negotiation
Asymmetric information
Transfer
WTO
Common agency
Two-level game
International Relations/Trade
O82
F13
H21
H71
H77
|
| Resumo: |
This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a transfer process uses up additional resources. The difficulty of making transfers renders it less likely that a nation would find it individually rational to participate as a member of an international institution. Costly transfers render the internal and international adjustment difficult, and serve as a barrier to trade liberalization. Costly international transfers harden the resistance against trade liberalization in the (potentially) recipient country and soften it in the (potentially) donor country.
|
| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
|
| Idioma: |
Inglês
|
| Identificador: |
19629
http://purl.umn.edu/28490
|
| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
|
| Relação: |
Yale University>Economic Growth Center>Center Discussion Papers
Center Discussion Paper No. 910
|
| Formato: |
37
application/pdf
|
