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Provedor de dados:  AgEcon
País:  United States
Título:  Cooperation and Cheating
Autores:  Cross, Robin M.
Buccola, Steven T.
Thomann, Enrique A.
Data:  2006-07-21
Ano:  2006
Palavras-chave:  Marketing
Resumo:  In this article, we extend the variable delivery claim framework (Cross, Buccola, and Thomann, 2006) to examine the option-to-cheat, that is, the option to shift production between contracts ex post. We use this framework to provide a solution to the age-old conflict between enforcement and the cooperative tradition of providing a “"home"” for member produce. We show that, in contrast to Nourse’'s competitive yardstick hypothesis, the value of the cooperative-provided option increases as market competition intensifies. When the option-to-cheat is fairly-priced, it is Pareto improving, increasing grower returns, lowering cooperative per-unit costs and reducing contract shortfalls for investor-owned rivals at no additional per-unit cost. Our valuation framework is consistent with replication-based equilibria and is free from parametric specification of individual preference or firm cost structure.
Tipo:  Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma:  Inglês
Identificador:  23100
Editor:  AgEcon Search
Relação:  American Agricultural Economics Association>2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA
Organized Symposium Paper
Formato:  30


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