| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
USING BOTH SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD
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| Autores: |
Richter, Francisca G.-C.
Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe
Brorsen, B. Wade
Currier, Kevin
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| Data: |
2003-01-09
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| Ano: |
2003
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| Palavras-chave: |
Marketing
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| Resumo: |
Economists tend to focus on monetary incentives. In the model developed here, both sociological and economic incentives are used to diminish the apparent moral hazard problem existing in commodity grading. Training that promotes graders' response to sociological incentives is shown to increase expected benefits. The model suggests that this training be increased up to the point where the marginal benefit due to training equals its marginal cost. It may be more economical to influence the grader's behavior by creating cognitive dissonance through training and rules rather than by using economic incentives alone.
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| Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
6655
http://purl.umn.edu/35009
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
Southern Agricultural Economics Association>2003 Annual Meeting, February 1-5, 2003, Mobile, Alabama
Selected Paper
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| Formato: |
16
application/pdf
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