Registro completo |
Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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País: |
United States
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Título: |
Distributing pollution rights in cap-and-trade programs: are outcomes independent of allocation?
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Autores: |
Fowlie, Meredith
Perloff, Jeffrey M.
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Data: |
2009-01-22
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Ano: |
2008
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Palavras-chave: |
Air pollution
Emissions trading
Transaction costs
Environmental Economics and Policy
D21
D23
H11
Q50
Q53
Q58
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Resumo: |
According to the Coase theorem, if property rights to pollute are clearly established and emissions permit markets nearly eliminate transaction costs, the permit market equilibrium will be independent of how the permits are initially distributed among
firms. Testing the independence of
firms' permit allocations and emissions is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. We exploit the random assignment of
firms to different permit allocation cycles in Southern California's RECLAIM Program to test for a causal relationship between facility-level emissions and initial permit allocations. Our primary
finding is that a null hypothesis of zero effect cannot be rejected.
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Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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Idioma: |
Inglês
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Identificador: |
http://purl.umn.edu/47002
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Relação: |
University of California, Berkeley>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>CUDARE Working Papers
CUDARE Working Paper
968R
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Formato: |
43
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