| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
GAME MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
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| Autores: |
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.
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| Data: |
1998-04-29
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| Ano: |
1995
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| Palavras-chave: |
Environmental
Policy
Open
Economy
Game
Environmental Economics and Policy
D62
F13
Q28
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| Resumo: |
In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game where there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer distortions but are less costly to implement. In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone. Published in Annals of Regional Science 30 (2, 1996): 185-200.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
622
http://purl.umn.edu/28364
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| Editor: |
AgEcon Search
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| Relação: |
Utah State University>Economics Department>Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers
ERI Study Paper 95-11
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| Formato: |
28
application/pdf
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