| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements
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| Autores: |
Gonzalez, Patrick
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| Data: |
2011-11-15
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| Ano: |
2011
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| Palavras-chave: |
Certification
Voluntary agreements
Pigovian taxes
Pollution
Environmental Economics and Policy
L51
Q53
Q58
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| Resumo: |
I model the participation of firms in a voluntary agreement as a costly certification process whereby a firm informs the Regulator of its pollution intensity. Without this knowledge, the Regulator imposes the same tax on all firms in a heterogeneous industry, unduly hurting the clean ones with the lowest intensity. Certification allows clean firms to get a tax rebate. It also entails an informational externality as the dispersion of types decreases within the pool of non-participating firms, following an unraveling process. Because participation is a firm’s private decision, there is such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
ISSN 1927-5544
http://purl.umn.edu/117827
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| Relação: |
University of Laval>Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE)>Working Papers
CREATE Working Paper
2011-2
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| Formato: |
35
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