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| Registros recuperados: 68 | |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development. In this note, I extend the AFH analysis in two directions. I model the land development problem in a dynamic framework, explicitly specifying an information production function. In such a setting, I then ask and answer the question concerning when development should take place. Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Management |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development; Dynamic; Information; Uncertainty; Land Economics/Use; D82; Q20. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28356 |
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| Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C.. |
| The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233 |
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| Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. |
| The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568 |
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| de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth. |
| Temptation for tenants to under-report output levels under share contracts is undoubtedly high. There is evidence that theft of product occurs and that this affects the design of share contracts. In this case, the optimal output share is chosen to not only induce effort but also to reduce theft of product, while meeting the landlord's limited liability obligation. The tenant's share thus rises with his desire and ability to steal. The optimal contract allows both residual inefficiency in the provision of effort and residual cheating. This contract is also modified by process utility in cheating, ability of the landlord to supervise, risk of revenge with abusive surveillance, and switch to products less prone to theft. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Sharecropping; Cheating; Agrarian contract; Farm Management; Labor and Human Capital; D82; Q15; O17. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25119 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino. |
| When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370 |
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| Bierbrauer, Felix. |
| The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Regulation; Public Economics; D02; D82; H41; L51. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55325 |
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| Registros recuperados: 68 | |
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