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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| East, Miriam. |
| In the Mackay Whitsunday region, the dominant grazing based operations are small intensive systems that heavily utilise soil, nutrient and chemical management practices. To improve water quality entering the Great Barrier Reef, graziers are being encouraged to adopt improved management practices. However, while there is good understanding of the management changes required to reach improved practice classification levels, there is poor understanding of the likely economic implications for a grazier seeking to move from a lower level classification to the higher level classifications. This paper provides analysis of the costs and benefits associated with adoption of intensive grazing best management practices to determine the effect on the profitability and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Grazing; Management practices; Incentives; Mackay Whitsunday; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59070 |
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| Leonard, Kenneth L.; Masatu, Melkiory C.. |
| Medicine is a professional pursuit, and even in developing countries professionalism should lead at least some practitioners to care for their patients despite the absence of direct incentives to do so. Even if practitioners do not behave as professionals, what is the extent of latent professionalism, in which socialization in the profession conditions health workers to respond to a demand for professionalism even if they do not normally act as professionals? How many health care workers in developing countries act as professionals all the time and what will happen if health services turn toward remuneration schemes in which health workers are paid by the output or outcome? We examine the behavior of 80 practitioners from Arusha region of Tanzania for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentives; Quality; Health care; Professionalism; Tanzania; Health Economics and Policy; I1; O1; O2. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42883 |
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| Gregg, Daniel; Greiner, Romy. |
| The adoption of conservation practices is a complex matter – rural landholders consider a wide variety of factors and characteristics when deciding whether to adopt a conservation practice. To confound the issue, recent research has suggested that the goals of landholders affect the adoption of conservation practices by creating a subjective consideration of the relative importance of impediments and effectiveness of incentives in the adoption decision. In this research we describe an empirical link between graziers’ goals and their perceptions of the relative importance of impediments and the effectiveness of incentives in the adoption of conservation practices. The research was carried out in the tropical savannas region of Australia where pastoral... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Graziers; Goals; Conservation; Tropical savannas; Impediments; Incentives; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49923 |
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| Cadot, Julien. |
| This research aims at identifying the incentives associated to collaterals in an asymmetric information context and when the bank is the main financial partner of the entrepreneurs, which is typically the case for most farms and especially in the wine sector. In one hand, collaterals may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and so reduce the risk of repayment default. In the other hand, to contract collaterals may lead the bank to reduce the monitoring effort. In this paper we test these two hypotheses in taking into account the fact that entrepreneurs can benefit from a banking relationship or not. Our results confirm that collaterals’ incentives depend on the bank monitoring. Moreover, this emphasizes the uniqueness of land mortgages.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Collaterals; Incentives; Bank monitoring; Agricultural Finance; G32; G33; G35. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103414 |
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| Lee, Myoungki; Wu, Steven Y.; Fan, Maoyong. |
| This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract law; Contract regulation; Damages; Incentives; Principal-agent; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42461 |
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| Olesen, Henrik Ballebye. |
| This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers. General problems from the contract theory such as hold up, moral hazard, risk sharing and screening are analyzed. The paper illustrates the tradeoffs between these problems in design of contracts. By negotiating the contract through a pea-growers association, the farmers gain some bargaining power. Thus the farmers can ensure that Danisco Foods uses only one contract for all farmers. This paper analyzes the consequences of the farmers'... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Contract theory; Coordination; Incentives; Risk sharing; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24200 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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