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| Registros recuperados: 51 | |
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| Hamilton, Stephen F.; Innes, Robert. |
| This paper considers vertical restraints in a multi-market retail setting in which each retailer sells the complete line of manufactured goods. Vertical restraints by one manufacturer on the retailers of its product serve as an instrument to exert horizontal control over the retail price of a rival manufactured good. Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand sold at both supermarkets can employ vertical restraints to control the pricing of the retailer's competing private labels, and for the personal computer industry, where the manufacturer of an essential computer component can use vertical restraints to control the pricing of complementary components bundled with the essential component by... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Vertical restraints; Monopolization.; Marketing; L13; L14; L42; D43.. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21424 |
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| Raynaud, Emmanuel; Sauvee, Loic; Valceschini, Egizio. |
| For many agricultural products, the quality of the final products strongly depends on different stages of the productive chain. This stresses the importance of relationships between quality signal owners and suppliers in the vertical chain. Based on a New Institutional Economics analysis, the goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to design a framework to study the links between quality signaling, coordination in the supply chains and the institutional environment, (ii) to conduct a comparative analysis to identify, compare and explain the modes of organization implemented for the governance of different quality signs. The general hypothesis is that, in order to assure the credibility of a quality signal, there must be an efficient alignment between quality... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Alignment; Credibility; Governance structures; Quality signals; Agribusiness; L14; L15; L22. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24917 |
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| Sykuta, Michael E.; Klein, Peter G.; James, Harvey S., Jr.. |
| The rise of contract farming and vertical integration is one of the most important changes in modern agriculture. Yet the adoption and diffusion of these new forms of organization has varied widely across regions, commodities, or farm types, however. Transaction cost theories and the like are not fully effective at explaining the variation of adoption rates of different organizational forms, in part because of their inherent static nature. In order to explain the adoption, diffusion and evolution of organizational form, a more dynamic framework is required. This paper lays out such a framework for understanding the evolution of organizational practices in U.S. agriculture by drawing on existing theories of economic organization, the diffusion of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Vertical integration; Organizational innovation; Diffusion; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; L14; L22; Q13; O33. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19390 |
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| Just, David R.; Wu, Steven Y.. |
| Loss aversion has become the dominant alternative to expected utility theory for modeling choice under uncertainty. The setting of the base payment in contracts provides an interesting application of referenced based decision theory. The impact of loss aversion on contract structure depends critically on whether reservation opportunities (outside options) are evaluated with respect to the reference point implied in the contract. We show that when reservation opportunities are independent of the reference point, reward contracts are optimal. However, when reservation opportunities are evaluated against the reference point, then penalty contracts are more efficient. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty; L14; D81; D21; D82. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28727 |
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| Freire Junior, Weimar da Rocha; Carvalheiro, Elizangela Mara; Staduto, Jefferson Andronio Ramundo; Opazo, Miguel Angel Uribe. |
| This study, in the light of transaction cost theory, has assessed the contractual relationships, eliciting the contracts in the Brazilian agribusiness. By using the transaction attributes in their main vectors of the features in which give the possibility to design the government structure of the lower cost. The contracts present a government structure, which when they are widely considered to represent a variety of agreement among the economic agents. On this system, the analysis to be developed is going to adopt a statistic multivariate method, which is going to assess nine contracts mostly consonant with the agribusiness (five contracts on sales, three on franchising and one on agriculture joint venture). These relationships facilitate to emphasize... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract; Transaction costs economy; Multivariate analysis.; Agribusiness; Q13; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61246 |
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| Registros recuperados: 51 | |
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