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Registros recuperados: 87
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Non-Constant Discounting in Continuous Time AgEcon
Karp, Larry S..
This note derives the dynamic programming equation (DPE) to a differentiable Markov Perfect equilibrium in a problem with non-constant discounting and general functional forms. We begin with a discrete stage model and take the limit as the length of the stage goes to 0 to obtain the DPE corresponding to the continuous time problem. We characterize the multiplicity of equilibria under non-constant discounting and discuss the relation between a given equilibrium of that model and the unique equilibrium of a related problem with constant discounting. We calculate the bounds of the set of candidate steady states and we Pareto rank the equilibria.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Hyperbolic discounting; Time consistency; Markov equilibria; Non-uniqueness; Observational equivalence; Pareto efficiency; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D83; L50.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25050
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When Promoters Like Scalpers AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Perloff, Jeffrey M..
If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Intertemporal price discrimination; Scalpers; Coordination game; Common knowledge; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; L12; D42; D45; D82.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25087
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Learning-by-Doing and the Choice of Technology: The Role of Patience AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In Ho.
If agents learn-by-doing and are myopic, less advanced firms might adopt new technologies while more advanced firms stick with the old technology. This kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are sufficiently patient. A finite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Learning-by-doing; Overtaking; Leapfrogging; Technology adoption; Economic growth; International Development; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D92; O14; O33.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25108
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LIFETIME LEVERAGE CHOICE FOR PROPRIETARY FARMERS IN A DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT AgEcon
Collins, Robert A.; Karp, Larry S..
This article reviews various models that may be used to explain optimal leverage choice for the proprietary farmer in a stochastic dynamic environment and develops a new model that highlights the risk of failure rather than the usual concept of risk as the variability of wealth. The model suggests that in addition to the usual factors, farm financial leverage is affected by age, wealth, and the opportunity cost of farming.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Farm Management.
Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30962
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The Failure of Strategic Industrial Policies Due to the Manipulation by Firms AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Perloff, Jeffrey M..
The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strategic trade policy; Convex adjustment costs; Markov perfect equilibria; International Relations/Trade; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; 410; 026.
Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6052
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Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant AgEcon
Hoel, Michael; Karp, Larry S..
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and the environmental damage depends on the stock of pollution. We thus extend, to a dynamic framework, previous studies in which environmental damages depend on the flow of pollution. As with the static analysis, an increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. In addition, in the dynamic model, an increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favor the use of taxes. Taxes certainly dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Taxes and quotas; Stochastic control; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25010
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DOMESTIC AND TRADE POLICY FOR CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Stefanou, Spiro E..
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51110
Registros recuperados: 87
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