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| Registros recuperados: 42 | |
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| Hoel, Michael; Karp, Larry S.. |
| We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and the environmental damage depends on the stock of pollution. We thus extend, to a dynamic framework, previous studies in which environmental damages depend on the flow of pollution. As with the static analysis, an increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. In addition, in the dynamic model, an increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favor the use of taxes. Taxes certainly dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Taxes and quotas; Stochastic control; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25010 |
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| Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary. Evaluating reductions requires assigning a baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns. Parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for baseline determination may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Clean Development Mechanism; Baseline emissions; Asymmetric information; Environmental Economics and Policy; D8; Q4. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10520 |
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| Castriota, Stefano; Delmastro, Marco. |
| The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the universe of wineries located in four regions of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Reputation; Credibility; Asymmetric information; Quality standards; Industrial Organization; L14; L15. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45504 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Costello, Christopher. |
| We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Quotas; Asymmetric information; Searching; International Relations/Trade; D83; L50. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6245 |
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| Ward, Ruby A.; Hunnicutt, Lynn; Keith, John E.. |
| An information asymmetry exists in the market for organic produce since consumers cannot determine whether produce is organically or conventionally grown. Various methods may solve this problem including signaling, reputation, and certification. Signaling and reputation may not work well, because signals are noisy, and reputation may be difficult for a producer to establish. Certification of the farm and its growing methods shows the most promise. A survey instrument testing the efficacy of certification is presented along with empirical analysis suggesting that no notable difference existed between independent certification methods, although independent certification had significantly different effects than self-certification. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Ordered probit; Organic produce; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8145 |
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| Registros recuperados: 42 | |
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