SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Meyer, Leandro Fredrico Ferraz; Braga, Marcelo Jose.

The paper presents experimental results connecting the participant’s behaviors in a common-pool resource dilemma, including communication and sanctioning conditions, with the constructs in a selected theory of adult personality systems development including value judgment and moral reasoning.

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents

Palavras-chave: Commons dilemma; Experimental economics; Institutional analysis; Psychosocial development; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D74.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51340

Ule, Aljaz; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno.

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all...

Problem Solving and Hypothesis Testing Using Economic Experiments

Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099

VOLUNTARY REVELATION OF THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC GOODS USING A PROVISION POINT MECHANISM

Hudson, Darren.

The roots and uses of economic experiments in problem solving and hypothesis testing are explored in the present article. The literature suggests that the primary advantage of economics experiments is the ability to use controlled stimuli to test economic hypotheses. Other literature also suggests that experiments are useful in problem solving settings. The advantages and disadvantages of experiments are discussed.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Experiments; Problem solving; Hypothesis testing; C81; C91; C92; C93.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43209

Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Poe, Gregory L..

Revised July 1998

Using Experimental Auctions for Marketing Applications: A Discussion

Palavras-chave: Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Information; Group size; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H41; C92.

Ano: 1997

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7265

Exogenous Targeting Instruments under Differing Information Conditions

Lusk, Jayson L..

The present article discusses general issues associated with experimental auctions and their relative advantages and disadvantages over other marketing research techniques. Experimental auctions create an active market environment with feedback where subjects exchange real goods and real money, which is not generally the case with other methods. The article also discusses four experimental design issues associated with experimental auctions: auction mechanism, market feedback and bidder affiliation, demand reduction and wealth effects, and multiple attribute valuation. Each of these experimental design issues, if not properly controlled, have the potential to create serious flaws in marketing recommendations.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Experimental economics; Marketing; Valuation; Willingness-to-pay; D44; C92; Q13; M31.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43210

Spraggon, John M..

This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with...

On the Micro-Foundations of Money: The Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op

Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383

Hens, Thorsten; Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner; Vogt, Bodo.

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralized markets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationary monetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. The experiment gives support to the theoretical approach.

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Palavras-chave: Micro foundations of money; Optimal; Quantity of money; Financial Economics; C73; C91; C92; E40; E41; E42.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26320

McEvoy, David M.; Cherry, Todd L.; Stranlund, John K..

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.

Subsidy Incidence in Agricultural Land Markets: An Experimental Investigation

Palavras-chave: Public goods; Coalition formation; Inequality aversion; Participation requirement; Experiments; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; H41.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102265

Nagler, Amy M.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Bastian, Christopher T.; Ehmke, Mariah D..

We use laboratory market experiments to control for market power and social norms in order to evaluate market outcomes associated with subsidy incidence. We estimate the incidence of a stylized agricultural subsidy in laboratory land rental negotiations and compare the market behavior of university students to agricultural professionals. In separate sessions with both subject groups, 21.5 percent of a per-unit subsidy paid to the buyer (tenant) was passed on to sellers (landlords). The consistent treatment effect between students and professionals is encouraging, particularly in the use of experimental laboratory methods for ex ante analyses of agricultural policy impacts.

Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design for Stated Choice Surveys: A Multiple Alternative Choice Case

Palavras-chave: Agricultural subsidies; Ex ante policy analysis; Laboratory market experiments; Land market; Professional versus student subject pools; Subsidy incidence; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q1; Q18; C92.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103032

Das, Chhandita; Anderson, Christopher M..

Paper removed by author 02/04/09.

Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament

Palavras-chave: Stated choice survey; Mechanism design; Public goods experiment; Demand and Price Analysis; C42; C72; C92; D02; H41; Q51.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9823

Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the...

Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884

Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence

Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883

McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance...

Fear or Greed? Duty or Solidarity? Motivations and Stages of Moral Reasoning: Experimental Evidences from Public-Goods Provision Dilemmas

Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126

Meyer, Leandro Fredrico Ferraz; Braga, Marcelo Jose.

As economists increasingly recognize the limits of the canonical self-interest assumption, the lack of a theory of human valuation that clearly specifies what determines an individual’s utility judgments renders the prediction of behavior in social dilemmas virtually impossible. In this study, we examined the explanatory power of a structuralist-constructivist theory of adult development and this theory’s analytical significance to the understanding of behavioral diversity in situations where individual and collective interests collide. Experimental results suggest that the theoretical constructs built into the selected theory provide a reliable basis for predicting participants’ behavior when presented with two different collective-action dilemmas under...

Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism

Palavras-chave: Social dilemmas; Experimental economics; Sociocognitive and moral reasoning; Adult development; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D74.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53249

Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A..

Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing...

Corporate and Consumer Social Responsibilities: Label Regulations in the Lab

Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132

Etile, Fabrice; Teyssier, Sabrina.

Although consumer attitudes toward corporate social responsibility are positive, socially responsible (SR) products are far from gaining significant market shares. Information asymmetries have been identified as one of the factor contributing to this attitude-behaviour gap, because social responsibility is a credence attribute. Signalling may remedy this market failure. We use an experimental posted offer market to investigate the impact of various regulatory requirements for labels on sellers’ choice to supply SR products and to signal it, and on buyers’ choice of ethical quality. Three treatments are tested: label certification by a third-party, “cheap-talk signalling” with random monitoring and with or without reputations. Individual social preferences...

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Labels; Social responsibility; Social preferences; Separating equilibrium; Market game; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Marketing; C92; D82; L15; M14.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120399

Motives for sharing in social networks

Ligon, Ethan; Schechter, Laura.

What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed `real-world' gift-giving, while...

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C92; C93; D03; D64; D85; O17.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120376

Fear or greed? Duty or solidarity? Motivations and the development of sociocognitive and moral reasoning: experimental evidences from public-goods provision dilemmas

Meyer, Leandro Fredrico Ferraz; Braga, Marcelo Jose.

The paper presents results connecting the participant’s motivations and behaviors in a step-level give some dilemma with the constructs in a selected theory of adult personality systems development including value judgment and moral reasoning.

Decoupled Programs, Payment Incidence, and Factor Markets: Evidence from Market Experiments

Palavras-chave: Public-goods; Experimental economics; Psychosocial development; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D74.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51339

Bastian, Christopher T.; Nagler, Amy M.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Ehmke, Mariah D.; Whitaker, James B.; Young, C. Edwin.

We use laboratory market experiments to assess the impact of asymmetric knowledge of a per-unit subsidy and the effect of a decoupled annual income subsidy on factor market outcomes. Results indicate that when the subsidy is tied to the factor as a per-unit subsidy, regardless of full or asymmetric knowledge for market participants, subsidized factor buyers distribute nearly 22 percent of the subsidy to factor sellers. When the subsidy is fully decoupled from the factor, as is the case with the annual payment, payment incidence is mitigated and prices are not statistically different from the no-policy treatment.

Equity judgments and context dependence: Knowledge, efficiency and incentives

Palavras-chave: Laboratory market experiments; Agricultural subsidies; Subsidy incidence; Land market; Ex ante policy analysis; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q18; D03; C92.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104108

Schilizzi, Steven.

Distributional equity concerns are often at least as important as economic efficiency and ecological sustainability in environmental and natural resource management policies. Until recently, however, economists have shied away from tackling equity issues, primarily because equity appeared as a slippery concept, varying across people and circumstances. This study takes this context-dependence of equity judgments as a starting point and shows that such dependence, far from being random, is systematic. A series of controlled laboratory treatments with University students were designed to investigate the role on distributional equity judgments of such context factors as knowledge of one’s position in society, how the existence of equity-efficiency tradeoffs...