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| Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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| Pellegrini, Lorenzo. |
| Corruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible solutions. As we highlight in this study, the crime and punishment approach is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden centralised forest management regime, institutional reform should move away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal management of natural... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Forest management; Environmental policy; Institutional reform; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; Q24; Q57. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7439 |
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| Zhang, Xiaobo; Fan, Shenggen; Zhang, Linxiu; Huang, Jikun. |
| In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance structure is a key issue and, increasingly, empirical evaluation of the effects of democratization on the provision of local public goods is needed. Since the early 1990s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local-government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this paper compares governance by elected officials with that of appointed cadres and finds that elected officials tend to tax constituents less and provide them with higher levels of public services. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Governance; Democracy; Public goods provision; China; Public Economics; D73; H41; P35. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/16120 |
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| Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno. |
| This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Democracy; Income inequality; Property rights; Political Economy; D73; H11; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99685 |
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| Dincer, Oguzhan C.; Gunalp, Burak. |
| In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Our analysis advances the existing literature in four ways. First, instead of using corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we use all commonly used inequality and poverty measures including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, standard deviation of the logarithms, relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and the poverty rate defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Third, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise due to data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality, and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Income Inequality; Poverty; D31; D73; I32. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37848 |
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| Gennaioli, Caterina; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector. Taking a political economy approach, we analyze the link between public support schemes for renewable energy and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. The insights of a model of political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using a panel data of Italian provinces for the period 1990-2007. We find evidence that a curse exists in the case of wind energy, and specifically that: i) criminal association activity increased more in high-wind provinces and especially after the introduction of a more favourable public policy regime and, ii) the expansion of the wind energy sector has been driven by both the wind level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Natural Resources Curse; Wind Energy; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115846 |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353 |
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| Michaelowa, Katharina; Borrmann, Axel. |
| Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176 |
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| Oleinik, Anton. |
| Modernity is usually thought as a complex society with clearly differentiated spheres of everyday life. It means, in particular, that economic rules do not interfere with the norms structuring political, social, scientific and other interactions. The complex, differentiated society sharply contrasts with a "small" and homogeneous "pre-modern" society. The process of modernization, i.e. differentiation of the spheres of everyday life, can take various forms. In an advanced country it relies on internal forces. Modernization in this context looks like an evolutionary, "bottom-up" development. In a backward country (Russia and Germany in the first half of the 20th century), modernization requires a strong governmental (from the top to the bottom)... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: State bureaucracy; Economic backwardness; Catch-up modernization; Conservative modernization; Opportunism; Institutional constraints; Power; Authority; Invidious comparison; Institutional importation; Democracy; Shared mental model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; A14; B15; B25; B52; D73; H83; K42; N40; O17; P21; P37; P51. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26333 |
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| Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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