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| Registros recuperados: 29 | |
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| Kazmierczak, Richard F., Jr.; Zapata, Hector O.; Diop, Hamady. |
| Octopus exports are an important source of foreign exchange for Mauritania. The export market has historically been dominated by coordinated Japanese buyers, a situation that led Mauritania to create the Societe Mauritanienne de Commercialisation de Poisson (SMCP) to negotiate with buyers and manage all octopus exports. Issues concerning competitiveness, price discrimination, and exchange rate pass-through in the Mauritanian octopus export market corrected for contemporaneous and serial correlation. Results indicate some degree of price discrimination across destination markets, market share enhancement through local currency price stabilization, and increases in marginal costs of production following nationalization of the Mauritanian trawler fleet. Thus,... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: International trade; Exchange rates; Imperfect competition; Octopus fisheries; Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90407 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among firms in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing generally leads to increases in expected total welfare but may reduce expected firm profits. Even when expected firm profits increase, information sharing does not represent equilibrium behavior because firms face a prisoner?s dilemma in which it is privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report truthfully. This equilibrium can be overcome if firms commit to simultaneously reporting their information and if reports are verifiable. We argue that agricultural bargaining associations serve both these roles. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Bargaining; Imperfect competition; Information; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18576 |
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| Gatsios, Konstantine; Karp, Larry S.. |
| Partial cooperation in setting trade policy may be worse than no cooperation for countries who form a customs union. The paper investigates three situations where this is likely to occur. First, if the countries forming the union comprise too small a percentage of the non-competitive sector of the industry, their cooperation may be disadvantageous for essentially the same reason that a merger may be disadvantageous in oligopolistic industries. Second, even if the countries forming the union comprise the entire non-competitive sector of industry, cooperation on trade policy may be disadvantageous if industrial policy (e.g. investment subsidies) are chosen non-cooperatively. The reason is that cooperation in trade policy may exacerbate the inefficiencies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trade and industrial policy; Imperfect competition; Customs union; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1989 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51256 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| This paper identifies market and commodity characteristics that seem to support successful cooperative bargaining in markets for farm output. Bargaining is not just about increasing prices paid to farmers; indeed, although there is very little empirical research that addresses the issue, what evidence does exist suggests that cooperative bargaining has very little direct influence on price. Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may be useful in itself as a form of price discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about market supply and demand conditions, and bargaining associations can play an important role in ensuring contract reliability. These and other benefits must be weighed against the organizational and ongoing operational costs of a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Cooperative bargaining; Imperfect competition; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18526 |
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| Langyintuo, Augustine S.. |
| Interspatial and intertemporal grain distribution in Ghana is a private sector activity carried out mainly by traders. These traders sometimes collude to maximize their joint profits. By so doing they influence the conduct of the grains market. To examine the effect of their actions on the informal maize market in Ghana, a spatial equilibrium model was estimated under three scenarios: (1) Perfect competition, (2) Cournot-Narsh conjectures, and (3) Collusion. The results indicate that imperfect competition distorts grain flows, reduces consumer welfare and depresses traders’ sales revenue. Collusive behavior of traders, on the other hand, causes the greatest distortion of grain flows as well as trader and consumer welfare. These results draw attention to... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Spatial equilibrium; Monopoly; Imperfect competition; Interspatial; Cournot- Narsh conjectures; Crop Production/Industries; D4; L1. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96166 |
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| Registros recuperados: 29 | |
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