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| Registros recuperados: 993 | |
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| Swinnen, Johan F.M.; Vandemartele, Thijs; Hirschauer, Norbert; Gaetano, Martino; Nijhoff-Savvaki, Rannia; Trienekens, Jacques H.; Omta, S.W.F. (Onno); Bachev, Hrabrin Ianouchev; Bezat-Jarzębowska, Agnieszka; Jarzebowski, Sebastian; Paus, Marguerite; Singh, Dheeraj; Prahalad, V.C.; Wangshu, Lobsang; Bakucs, Lajos Zoltan; Ferto, Imre; Havas, Attila; Ehlers, Melf-Hinrich; Bojnec, Stefan; Ferto, Imre; Levkovych, Inna; Toth, Aniko; Forgacs, Csaba. |
| The rise of a western-style middle class in many successful emerging economies like China currently is inducing deep structural changes on agricultural world markets and within the global agri-food business. As a result of both higher incomes and concerns over product safety and quality the global demand for high-quality and safe food products is increasing significantly. In order to meet the new required quality, globally minimum quality standards are rising and private standards emerging. All over the world these developments cause adjustments at the enterprise, chain and market levels. At the same time, the tremendously increasing demand for renewable energy has led to the emergence of a highly promising market for biomass production. This has... |
| Tipo: Book |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; Marketing; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92317 |
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| Vaubel, Roland. |
| Der Aufsatz zeigt anhand zahlreicher Beispiele und quantitativer Analysen, dass internationale Organisationen - mehr als alle anderen staatlichen Institutionen - ein extremes Kontrolldefizit aufweisen. Umfragen belegen, dass sie andere Interessen als die Bürger haben. Sie können diese Interessen auch durchsetzen, weil die Informationskosten der Bürger hoch, ihre Kontrollanreize gering und ihre Ausweichmöglichkeiten eingeschränkt sind. Die Parlamente können ihrer Kontrollfunktion nicht gerecht werden, weil sie von den nationalen und internationalen Exekutivorganen entmachtet werden. Von den nationalen Regierungen werden die internationalen Organisationen nur sehr unvollkommen kontrolliert, weil sie Agenda- Setting Macht besitzen und weil die Kontrollkosten... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International organisations; Principal-agent problem; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; H79; H11. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26392 |
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| Volk, Tina; Rednak, Miroslav; Erjavec, Emil; Cela, Roland; Marku, Shkelzen; Imami, Drini; Mikus, Ornella; Cerjak, Marija; Dimitrievski, Dragi; Georgiev, Nenad; Simonovska, Ana; Stojceska, Aleksandra Martinovska; Kotevska, Ana; Bozidarka, Markovic; Bogdanov, Natalija; Božić, Dragica. |
| The current publication covers Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99, the FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and provides an overview of the agricultural situation in the European Union (EU) candidate and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans (WBs). The objective was to provide an analysis of the development and current situation in agriculture and agricultural policy in these countries as relates to the EU accession process. The individual country reports, as well as a cross-country overview and comparison, have been prepared as a part of "AgriPolicy" project, which was financially supported by the European Commission under the 7th framework program. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96200 |
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| Adams, Claire-Louise; Goldsmith, Peter D.. |
| This paper focuses on strategic fuzzy alliances (SFAs) and the role of trust in business-to-business relationships. First, a theoretical model of governance choice involving strategic alliances is developed, integrating the Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) taxonomy of trust into a neoinstitutional framework. Second, this model, based on transaction theory, is then used to generate necessary and sufficient conditions for trust-based agreements. The third component of this paper is an empirical model, which tests the above theory. Finally, managerial implications from the results are discussed. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/34211 |
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| Poteete, Amy; Ostrom, Elinor. |
| Research on collective action confronts two major obstacles. First, inconsistency in the conceptualization and operationalization of collective action, the key factors expected to affect collective action, and the outcomes of collective action hampers the accumulation of knowledge. Inconsistent terminology obscures consistent patterns. Second, the scarcity of comparable data thwarts evaluation of the relative importance of the many variables identified in the literature as likely to influence collective action. The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program addresses both of these problems. Since its founding in 1993, the IFRI network of collaborating research centers has used a common set of methods and concepts to study... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Collective action; Institutions; Forestry research; Forestry; Natural resource management; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55444 |
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| Ule, Aljaz; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno. |
| This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099 |
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| Registros recuperados: 993 | |
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